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Abstract
We use a neoclassical open economy model with traded and non traded goods to in-
vestigate the sectoral effects of three tax reforms: i) two revenue-neutral shifting the tax
burden from labor to consumption taxes and ii) one labor tax restructuring keeping the
marginal tax wedge constant. Regardless of its type, a tax reform crowds-in both consump-
tion and investment and raises employment. Whereas tax reforms have a small impact on
GDP, they exert substantial effects on sectoral outputs which move in opposite direction
in the short-run. The sensitivity analysis reveals that raising the elasticity of labor supply
or reducing the tradable content in consumption expenditure amplifies the heterogeneity
in sectoral output responses. Finally, allowing for the markup to depend on the number of
competitors, we find that a substantial share of sectoral output variations can be attributed
to the change in the markup triggered by firm entry.
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1 Introduction
Tax reform is an important item on the current policy agenda and raises an academic enthu-
siasm. Most of the literature concludes that eliminating capital or labor income tax yields
substantial beneficial effects. Using a neoclassical framework with liquidity-constrained con-
sumers or human capital accumulation, Judd and Hubbard [1986] and Lucas [1990] have found
positive effects on consumption, capital accumulation and GDP. Others have explored the ef-
fects of tax reforms in an open economy and reach similar conclusions, see e.g. Mendoza and
Tesar [1998] and Coenen et al. [2008] who use two-country models of the neoclassical and of
the new Keynesian variety, respectively. In particular, Mendoza and Tesar [1998] have shown
that trade in world financial markets magnifies the welfare gains. Most of the analyses have
been confined to one-sector models, however. Whereas so far conclusions have been drawn only
for the aggregate economy, in the present paper, we take up the following question instead:
what are the sectoral effects of a tax reform?
To estimate the sectoral effects of a tax reform, we consider an open economy with a traded
and a non traded sector. Our neoclassical framework builds on Turnovsky and Sen [1995] and
Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003]. As Coto-Martinez and Dixon, we let the non traded sector
to be imperfectly competitive. Our work differs from analyses by Turnovsky and Sen [1995]
and Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] in one major respect. They investigate analytically the
effects of government spending shocks whereas we provide both an analytical and a quantitative
exploration of the effects of tax reforms. One attractive feature of a two-sector model with
tradables and non tradables is to cover both the closed-economy and open-economy dimensions
of contemporaneous industrialized countries. In particular, empirical evidence documents a
sizeable non tradable share in GDP and total employment, averaging to 60% approximately.1
A second key feature of a two-sector model is that a tax reform now produces a change in
the relative price of non tradables which triggers a reallocation of resources between the two
sectors. Third, our model allows to test if the labor intensive sector always benefits more from
the labor tax cut. Fourth, such a model enables us to connect sectoral output responses to the
trade balance adjustment.
To illustrate the potential importance in evaluating the effects of a tax reform at a sectoral
level, we plot in the scatter diagrams of Figure 1 both GDP and sectoral output growth rates in
percentage against the labor tax wedge for 27 OECD countries over the period 1994-2004 which
has been split into two sub-periods 1994-1998 and 1999-2004.2 Figure 1(b) suggests a negative
1Non tradable shares are reported in Appendix A.
2From the early Nineties, European tax systems were requested to achieve conflicting targets: reducing
unemployment rate and achieving budget balance over the medium run. Hence, the period 1994-2004 is of
1
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Figure 1: Growth and Labor Tax (1994-2004)
relationship between labor tax wedge and non traded output.3 By contrast, as illustrated in
Figure 1(c), traded output growth and labor tax wedge seem to show an opposite pattern.
Furthermore, Figure 1(c) suggests a negative but small relationship between the GDP growth
rate and labor taxes across countries. The model’s predictions are in line with these findings:
whereas traded and non traded sector vary in opposite direction in the short-run, a cut labor
taxes exerts a small impact on GDP (see Figure 1(a)).
Since tax reforms take various forms, we consider three simple and practicable tax restruc-
turing: i) two revenue-neutral tax reforms that reduce the marginal tax wedge by shifting the
tax burden from labor to consumption taxes and ii) one labor tax reform keeping the marginal
tax wedge constant by shifting the tax burden from employers to employees.4 We show formally
that regardless of its type, a tax restructuring crowds-in both consumption and investment,
and raises employment. These results confirm earlier conclusions reached by Mendoza and
Tesar [1998] who, in particular, experiment a tax reform replacing the labor income tax with
a consumption tax within a two-country framework. The intuition behind these results are
as follows. The fall in labor cost induces firms to raise wages which in turn stimulate labor
supply. The consecutive increase in labor income pushes up consumption. To meet greater
demand, the economy must accumulate capital. These conclusions are in line with the VAR
particular interest as a lot of countries compensate for labor tax cut by an increase in the consumption tax rate.
3Sample includes 27 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US. The labor tax wedge is taken from
OECD, Historical rates. Tax wedge includes income tax paid by workers and social security contributions levied
on employees and their employers for a single person at 100% of average earnings, no child. Method of calculation
of non traded and traded output is described in Appendix A. Source: KLEMS.
4While the two revenue-neutral tax reforms lower the marginal tax wedge, we consider a third strategy
which involves simultaneously cutting payroll taxes and raising labor income taxes so as to keep the tax wedge
constant. Whereas this labor tax restructuring does no longer keep the tax revenue fixed, it allows us to focus
on the composition on the tax wedge rather than its level.
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evidence documented by Blanchard and Perotti [2002] and Mertens and Ravn [2010], as long
as the tax reform is unanticipated. Furthermore, like Mendoza and Tesar, we find that trade
in world financial markets allows the open country to finance higher investment without sacri-
ficing consumption in the short-run. Hence, the open economy runs short-run current account
deficits which are compensated by a trade balance surplus in the long-run.
By differentiating between tradables and non tradables, our model yields new predictions
at a sectoral level. Following a tax reform, the non traded sector strongly expands on impact
while traded output falls dramatically. The reason is that the open country runs a deficit in
the trade balance in the short-run triggered by the investment boom. The fall in net exports
requires a drop in traded output which is achieved through a reallocation of resources towards
the non traded sector. Henceforth, sectoral outputs move in opposite direction in the short-run,
which implies that tax rates produce a small impact on GDP. By contrast, in the long-run,
a tax reform stimulates both traded and non traded output. The reason is that the debt
accumulated during the transition is serviced by a rise in net exports in the long-run. As
consumption increases, such a surplus in the trade balance is achieved through a rise in traded
output along the transitional path, triggered by the reallocation of resources towards the traded
sector.
As it is currently assumed in the two-sector literature, for analytical simplicity, we first
consider that the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector in discussing
the macroeconomic effects of tax reforms.5 Considering the case of reversal capital intensities,
numerical experiments show that the effects are roughly similar. By contrast, we find that
sectoral output responses are significantly sensitive to the elasticity of labor supply and the
tradable content of consumption expenditure. First, irrespective of sectoral capital intensities,
as labor supply gets more responsive, non traded output expands more while traded output
falls by a larger amount on impact. Second, we find that a fall in the tradable content of
consumption expenditure amplifies the heterogeneity in sectoral output responses, only when
the non traded sector is relatively more capital intensive.
We also conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to the degree of competition in the
product markets, by making the markup endogenous.6 The change in the markup provides an
additional channel through which a tax reform impinges on sectoral outputs. We find that,
by lowering the markup on impact, a tax reform stimulates further capital accumulation and
yields a larger current account deficit. Hence, non traded output expands more while traded
5See e.g. Obstfeld [1989], Mendoza [1995], or Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] who assume that the traded
sector is more capital intensive. Yet, our estimation of sectoral capital income shares in output show that the
non traded sector is relatively more capital intensive in five countries over thirteen.
6Coto-Martinez and Dixon [2003] consider the case of a fixed markup.
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output falls by a larger amount. The change of the markup amplifies the opposite responses of
sectoral outputs, the net overall effect on GDP remaining roughly similar.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the specification
of a two-sector model with traded and non traded goods. In Section 3, we discuss the short-
run and long-run effects of three tax reforms which involve cutting labor taxes. Section 4
provides a quantitative exploration of the sectoral effects and conducts a sensitivity analysis
with respect to key parameters. In Section 5, we analyze to which extent our results are
modified by considering that the non traded sector is more capital intensive. Section 6 explores
quantitatively the case of an endogenous markup. Section 7 summarizes our main results and
concludes.
2 The Framework
We consider a small open economy that is populated by a constant number of identical house-
holds and firms that have perfect foresight and live forever. The country is small in both world
goods and capital markets and faces given world interest rate, r?. A perfectly competitive sec-
tor produces a traded good denoted by the superscript T that can be exported and consumed
domestically. An imperfectly competitive sector produces a non traded good denoted by the
superscript N which is devoted to physical capital accumulation and domestic consumption.7
The traded good is chosen as numeraire.89
2.1 Households
At each instant the representative agent consumes traded goods and non traded goods de-
noted respectively by cT and cN , which are aggregated by a constant elasticity of substitution
function:
c
(
cT , cN
)
=
[
ϕ
1
φ
(
cT
)φ−1
φ + (1− ϕ) 1φ (cN)φ−1φ ] φφ−1 , (1)
with ϕ the weight attached to the traded good in the overall consumption bundle (0 < ϕ < 1)
and φ the intratemporal elasticity of substitution (φ > 0).
The agent is endowed with a unit of time and supplies a fraction L(t) as labor and the
remainder, l ≡ 1− L is consumed as leisure. At any instant of time, households derive utility
7As stressed by Turnovsky and Sen [1995], allowing for traded capital investment would not affect the results.
Furthermore, like Burstein et al. [2004], non tradable investment accounts for a large share of total investment
(i.e. 60%).
8The price of the traded good is determined on the world good market and exogenously given for the small
open economy.
9More details on the model as well as the derivations of the results which are stated below are provided in
an Appendix which is available on request.
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from their consumption and leisure. Households decide on consumption and worked hours by
maximizing lifetime utility:
U =
∫ ∞
0
{
1
1− 1σc
c(t)1−
1
σc − γ 1
1 + 1σL
L(t)1+
1
σL
}
e−βtdt, (2)
where β is the consumer’s discount rate, σc > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
for consumption, σL > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply;
Factor income is derived from supplying labor L at a wage rate w and capital K at a rental
rate rK .10 Labor is taxed at rate τH . The wage tax is levied on households’ wage income above
a certain threshold κ, which represents the personal tax allowance. Thus, wA = w−(w − κ) τH
corresponds to the after-tax wage. As long as tax allowances are positive, the tax system is
progressive which means that the average tax burden rises with the wage rate. In addition,
households accumulate internationally traded bonds, b(t), that yields net interest rate earnings
r?b(t). Denoting by Z lump-sum transfers from the government, the households’ flow budget
constraint writes as follows:
b˙(t) = r?b(t) + rK(t)K(t) + wA(t)L(t) + Z − pc (p(t)) (1 + τ c) c(t)− p(t)I(t), (3)
where pc is the consumption price index which is a function of the relative price of non traded
goods p. The last two terms represent households’ expenditure which include purchases in
consumption goods inclusive of consumption tax rate τ c, and investment expenditure pI. Ag-
gregate investment gives rise to overall capital accumulation according to the following dynamic
equation:
K˙(t) = I(t)− δKK(t). (4)
where we assume that physical capital depreciates at rate δK . From now thereon, the time-
argument is suppressed for clarity purpose.
Denoting by λ the co-state variable associated with equation (3), the first-order conditions
characterizing the representative household’s optimal plans are:
c = (pc (1 + τ c)λ)
σc , (5a)
L =
(
λ¯
γL
wA
)σL
, (5b)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (5c)
rK
p
− δK + p˙
p
= r?, (5d)
and the appropriate transversality condition. To generate an interior solution for the marginal
utility of wealth λ, we require the time preference rate to be equal to the world interest rate.
10We abstract from capital income tax which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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This standard assumption made in the literature implies that the marginal utility of wealth,
λ, must remain constant over time, i. e. λ = λ¯.
2.2 Firms
There are two sectors of production in the model producing a traded good T and a non traded
good N . The traded and non traded sectors face two cost components: a capital rental cost
equal to rK , and a labor cost equal to wF = w
(
1 + τF
)
with τF the the employer’s part of
labor taxes.
The traded sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive and use capital KT and labor LT
according to a constant returns to scale production function, Y T = F
(
KT , LT
)
, which has the
usual neoclassical properties of positive and diminishing marginal products. The first order
conditions derived from profit-maximization in the traded sector state that factors are paid to
their respective marginal products.
The final non traded output, Y N , is produced in a competitive retail sector using a constant-
returns-to-scale production which aggregates a continuum measure one of sectoral non traded
goods.11 We denote by ω > 0 the elasticity of substitution between any two different sectoral
goods. In each sector, there are N > 1 firms producing differentiated goods that are aggregated
into a sectoral non traded good. We denote by ² > 0 the elasticity of substitution between any
two varieties. We assume that the elasticity of substitution between any two goods within a
sector is higher than the elasticity of substitution across sectors, i.e. ² > ω (see e.g. Jaimovich
and Floetotto [2008]). Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each firm that
produces one variety is a price setter. Output Xi,j of firm i in sector j is produced using
capital and labor, i.e. Xi,j = H (Ki,j ,Li,j). Each firm chooses capital and labor by equalizing
markup-adjusted marginal products to the marginal cost of inputs, i. e. HK/µ = rK , and
HL/µ = wF , where µ is the markup over marginal costs. Aggregate non traded output is equal
to Y N = NX = H (KN , LN). We assume that there is a large number of firms within each
sector so that each single intermediate producer is small relative to the economy and thereby
each producer in one sector faces a constant price elasticity of demand ². Hence, one producer of
a variety charges a constant markup denoted by µ = ee−1 with e the price-elasticity of demand
equal to ² as the number of competitors is large. In section 6, we relax this assumption and
rather assume that a finite number of firms operate within each sectors producing non tradable
varieties.12 We further assume instantaneous entry which implies that the zero profit condition
11The setup builds on Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008] and thereby details of derivation are relegated to the
Appendix available on request.
12As stressed by Yang and Heijdra [1993], departing from the usual assumption made by Dixit and Stiglitz
[1977] implies that the price elasticity of demand becomes an increasing function of the number of firms and
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holds at each instant of time.
Denoting by ki ≡ Ki/Li the capital-labor ratio for sector i = T,N , we express the
production functions in intensive form, that is f
(
kT
) ≡ F (KT , LT ) /LT and h (kN) ≡
H
(
KN , LN
)
/LN . Production functions are supposed to take a Cobb-Douglas form: f
(
kT
)
=(
kT
)θT
, and h
(
kN
)
=
(
kN
)θN
, where θT and θN represent the capital income share in output
in the traded and non traded sector, respectively. Since inputs can freely move between the
two sectors, marginal products in the traded and the non traded sector equalize:
θT
(
kT
)θT−1
=
p
µ
θN
(
kN
)θN−1 ≡ rK , (6a)(
1− θT ) (kT )θT = p
µ
(
1− θN) (kN)θN ≡ wF . (6b)
Static efficiency conditions (6a)-(6b) state that sectoral marginal revenue products must equal-
ize to the labor producer cost wF and capital rental rate rK . System (6a)-(6b) can be solved
for sector capital intensities ratios: kT = kT (p) and kN = kN (p).
Aggregating labor and capital over the two sectors, we obtain the resource constraints for
both inputs:
LT + LN = L, KT +KN = K. (7)
2.3 Government
The final agent in the economy is the government who finances lump-sum transfers to house-
holds Z together with public spending falling on the traded gT and the non traded good pgN
by raising taxes on consumption, τ cpcc, and labor,
[
τH (w − κ) + τFw]L, according to the
following balanced condition:
τ cpcc+
[
τH (w − κ) + τFw]L = Z + gT + pgN . (8)
2.4 Macroeconomic Dynamics
The adjustment of the open economy towards the steady-state is described by a dynamic
system which comprises the dynamic equation for the relative price of non traded goods (5d)
which equalizes the return on domestic capital and traded bonds r?. The second equation is
the accumulation equation for physical capital which clears the non traded good market along
the transitional path. Solving first-order conditions for output and consumption, the market
clearing condition for the non traded good writes as:
K˙ = Y N (K,L, p) /µ− cN (λ¯, p, τ c)− gN − δKK, (9)
that the markup turns out to be endogenous.
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where L = L
(
λ¯, p, τF , τH , µ
)
is the short-run static solution of eq. (5b); consumption in the
non traded good cN is equal to αcpcc/p with αc is the non tradable content in consumption
expenditure. Solving eq. (5a) for consumption, the short-run static solution for cN follows. It
is worthwhile to notice that a labor tax cut, i.e. a fall in τF or τH , affects the macroeconomic
equilibrium by modifying labor supply decisions.
Dynamic equations (5d)-(9) form a separate subsystem in p and K.13 Denoting by a tilde
the steady-state value, stable solutions for K and p write as:
K(t)− K˜ =
(
K0 − K˜
)
eν1t, p(t)− p˜ = ω12
(
K(t)− K˜
)
, (10)
where ω12 ≤ 0 is the eigenvector associated with stable eigenvalue ν1. If kT > kN , we have
ω12 = 0, so that the relative p, consumption, labor, and thereby savings adjust immediately
to their steady-state levels. By contrast, with the reversal of capital intensities, transitional
dynamics for the consumption-side variables are restored as ω12 < 0. Substituting (9) and (8)
into (3), we obtain the dynamic equation for the current account denoted by ca:
b˙ = r?b+ Y T (K,L, p)− cT (λ¯, p, τ c)− gT , (11)
where cT = (1− αc) pcc is consumption in the traded good with (1− αc) the tradable content
in consumption expenditure. Equation (11) states that the current account is equal to the
trade balance denoted by nx, i.e. nx ≡ Y T − cT − gT , plus interest receipts on outstanding
assets.
2.5 Steady-State
We now discuss the salient features of the steady-state. Setting p˙ = 0 into eq. (5d),
we obtain the equality between the after-tax rate of return on domestic capital income
θN
(
k˜N
)θN−1
/µ − δK and the exogenous world interest rate, r?, that determines the steady-
state value of the relative price of non tradables p˜. The long-run level of p remains unaffected
by a tax restructuring, as long as the markup is fixed. The steady-state level of p determines
the wage rate w˜ =
θT [kT (p˜)]θ
T−1
1+τF
. By substituting the wage rate into the labor supply decision
evaluated at the steady-state, we get L˜ =
{
λ¯
γL
[
w˜ − (w˜ − κ) τH]}σL . For given λ¯, a cut in τF
raises the wage rate and thereby stimulates labor supply.
Setting K˙ = 0 into eq. (9) yields the market-clearing condition for the non traded good:
1
µ
Y N
(
K˜, L˜, p˜
)
= cN
(
λ¯, p˜, τ c
)
+ I˜ + gN , (12)
13Since the number of predetermined variables (K) equals the number of negative eigenvalues (denoted by ν1)
and the number of jump variables (p) equals the number of positive eigenvalues (denoted by ν2), the equilibrium
yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path, irrespective of the relative sizes of sectoral capital-labor
ratios.
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where I˜ = δKK˜.
Setting b˙ = 0 into eq. (11) yields the market-clearing condition for the traded good:
Y T
(
K˜, L˜, p˜
)
= −r?b˜+ cT (λ¯, p˜, τ c)+ gT . (13)
The intertemporal solvency condition can be solved for the shadow value of wealth:(
b˜− b0
)
= Ω
(
K˜ −K0
)
, (14)
where Ω < 0 describes the effect of capital accumulation on the the external asset position and
K0 and b0 are the initial stocks of capital and foreign assets.14
Eqs. (12)-(14) jointly determine the steady-state values of physical capital, K˜, foreign
bonds holding, b˜, and the shadow value of wealth, λ¯. It is worthwhile to note that eq. (14)
connects eqs. (12) and (13), and thereby sectoral outputs. More precisely, an investment boom
I˜ stimulates non traded output Y˜ N and traded output Y˜ T too since capital accumulation yields
a drop in b˜. The reason is that the fall in interest receipts due to lower traded bonds holding
must be exactly matched by a long-run improvement in the balance of trade which exerts a
positive impact on Y˜ T .
3 Effects of Tax Reforms: An Analytical Exploration
Since tax reforms can take various forms, we consider three types of tax restructuring. We
explore two revenue-neutral tax reforms which involve simultaneously either cutting payroll
taxes by dτF < 0 or labor income taxes by dτH < 0 and raising the consumption tax by
dτ c > 0. While these tax reforms cause a fall in the tax wedge, we consider a third tax
restructuring which involves simultaneously cutting payroll taxes by dτF < 0 and raising the
wage income tax rate dτH > 0 that leaves unchanged the tax wedge. The third policy allows us
to analyze a shift in the composition of the labor taxation rather than a change in the marginal
tax wedge defined as the difference between the producer wage and the after-tax marginal wage
expressed as a percentage of the producer cost: τM = 1− (1−τ
H)
(1+τF )
(see e.g. Heijdra and Ligthart
[2009]). Moreover, For pedagogical purpose, we assume that the traded sector is more capital
intensive than the non traded sector, i.e. kT > kN , as it is commonly assumed in the two-sector
literature. We explore the case of reversal capital intensities in section 5.
14If kT > kN , then Ω = −p˜ < 0. If kN > kT , Ω = −p˜
[
1 +
ω12
p˜ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK) Λ˜
)]
with 0 < Λ ≡
(1−τH)[
(1−τH)+ τHκw
] < 1.
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3.1 Revenue-Neutral Tax Reforms
We analyze first the long-run effects of a revenue-neutral tax reform. To avoid confusion, we
denote by
∣∣j,c the effects of a fall in the labor tax by dτ j < 0 (j = F,H) coordinated with a rise
in the consumption tax rate by dτ c
∣∣j,c which is endogenously determined so as the government
budget constraint is met. Assuming that the stock of financial wealth is positive, the labor tax
base is smaller than the consumption tax base.15 Hence, τ c must increase less than the drop
in labor tax.16
The long-term change of x = c, L,K, nx following a shift from labor tax to consumption
tax is equal to the sum of the expansionary impact of the labor tax cut by dτ j < 0 (j = F,H)
financed by lump-sum taxes (i.e. ∂x˜
∂τ j
dτ j > 0) and the recessionary effect triggered by the rise
in the consumption tax rate by dτ c
∣∣j,c (i.e. ∂x˜∂τcdτ c∣∣j,c < 0):17
dx˜
∣∣j,c = ∂x˜
∂τ j
dτ j +
∂x˜
∂τ c
dτ c
∣∣j,c ≡ Φj,c ∂x˜
∂τ j
dτ j > 0, j = F,H, (15)
where 0 < Φj,c < 1 (j = F,H). The second equality of eq. (15) states that the long-run change
in x = c, L,K, nx following a tax reform is simply a scaled-down version of the long-term
changes of x after a lump-sum tax financing labor tax cut. Consequently, a tax reform shifting
the labor tax to the consumption tax stimulates employment and consumption, and raises both
the capital stock and net exports. The reason is that a labor tax cut induces agents to supply
more labor. The consecutive increase in the after-tax labor income boosts consumption. In
the same time, the labor inflow in the non traded sector raises output in that sector which in
turn stimulates capital accumulation. The capital inflow in the traded sector raises its output
which results in a long-run improvement in the balance of trade. A tax reform produces the
same effects but now their size are moderated due to the scaling-down term 0 < Φj,c < 1.
Moreover, a tax reform stimulates further c, L,K, nx as the scaled-down term Φj,c gets
closer to unity. If the labor tax cut was financed by a rise in lump-sum taxes, Φj,c would
be equal to unity, and the higher bound of the net overall outcome of a tax reform would be
obtained. In contrast, if the stock of financial wealth was equal to zero, the consumption tax
15At the steady-state, denoting by a ≡ b + pK the stock of financial wealth, we have: r?a˜ + Z + w˜AL˜ =
pc (1 + τ
c) c˜. As long as r?a˜+ Z > 0, the consumption tax base is larger than the labor tax base.
16Both the labor tax cut and the rise in τ c yields opposite effects on tax receipts. On the one hand, a labor
tax cut lowers public revenue, keeping unchanged consumption and employment. Second, a labor tax rate cut
raises employment and consumption, and thereby tax revenues. While analytically, the net overall effect cannot
be signed, we find numerically that the former effect always more than offsets the latter effect. The same logic
applies to a change in the consumption tax rate. We find numerically that the net overall effect on tax revenues
of a labor tax cut is close to that following a rise in the consumption tax, in absolute terms. Hence, only the
ratio of the labor tax base to the consumption tax base matters in determining the size of the increase in τ c.
17Formal details can be retrieved in the Appendix.
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base would be equal to the labor tax base, and a tax reform would produce no effect.18 This
situation corresponds to the lower bound of the net overall outcome of a tax reform. The effects
of a tax restructuring falls between these two bounds.19
Let now discuss the impact effects. In the case kT > kN , the dynamics of the relative price
degenerate so that labor and real consumption increase immediately to their final long-term
levels. Investment is the result of demand and supply reactions in the non traded good market.
The increase in total employment induces a labor inflow in the non traded sector which boosts
Y N . While the initial rise in cN withdraws resources from capital accumulation, the stimulus
of non traded output is large enough to cause an investment boom on impact. Formally, using
stable solution (10), we have: dI(0)
∣∣j,c = −ν1dK˜∣∣j,c > 0. Finally, the open country runs a trade
balance deficit in the short run given by dnx(0)
∣∣j,c = ν1p˜dK˜∣∣j,c < 0, reflecting the immediate
boom in investment as savings remain unchanged.
So far, we have analyzed the effects of a labor tax cut coordinated with a rise in the
consumption tax rate, without differentiating between a cut in the employer’s (i.e. τF ) or
employee’s (i.e. τH) part of labor taxes. A drop in τH leaves unaffected w and raises the
after-tax labor income by (w˜ − κ). A cut in τF raises the wage rate and thereby the after-tax
labor income by w˜ 1−τ
H
1+τF
= w˜
(
1− τM), with τM the marginal tax wedge. Whereas the size of
the effects after a fall in τH decreases with tax progressiveness, the magnitude of the effects
following a fall in τF rises with the marginal tax wedge.
3.2 A Labor Tax Restructuring
As it is common in the literature investigating the macroeconomic effects of a tax reform, so
far we have analyzed revenue-neutral tax reforms. Let now consider that the policy maker
wishes to alter the composition of the marginal tax wedge without however, changing its level.
We denote by the superscript {F,H} the effects of a tax reform which involves simultaneously
cutting the employer’s part of labor tax and increasing the personal income tax dτH > 0 so as
to leave unchanged the marginal tax wedge (i. e. dτM = 0). A labor tax restructuring requires
a rise in the personal income tax by an amount given by:
dτH
∣∣F,H ≡ −1− τH
1 + τF
dτF =
(
τM − 1) dτF > 0. (16)
According to (16), the personal income tax must be increased by a smaller amount than the
fall in τF for keeping unchanged the marginal tax wedge. Intuitively, since the tax rate on a
18More rigorously, the labor tax base is equal to the consumption tax base if r?a˜+ Z = 0.
19The larger the share of financial wealth in real disposable income, the greater the consumption tax base
compared to the labor tax base, and thereby the closer to one the scaling-down term Φj,c. Hence, the less τ c
needs to increase for a given labor tax cut to balance the budget and the larger the effects of a tax reform on
c, L,K, nx.
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relatively large base is reduced and the tax rate on a relatively small base is increased, the
latter must rise by a smaller proportion than the former decreases so as to leave unchanged
τM .
The steady-state change of x = c, L,K, nx following a cut in τF , coordinated with a rise in
τH by an amount given by (16), reads:
dx˜
∣∣F,H = ΦF,H ∂x˜
∂τF
dτF =
κ
w˜
dτF , (17)
where 0 < ΦF,H ≡ κ/w˜ < 1. Setting κ to zero implies that such a tax reform will produce no
effects on the economy. Rather, as long as the labor tax scheme is progressive, i. e. κ > 0, the
labor tax reform leaving constant the tax wedge raises permanently x. As for revenue-neutral
tax reforms, the steady-state changes in c, L,K, nx are a scaled-down version of their long-term
changes following a labor tax cut financed by lump-sum taxes. The scaled-down term is equal
to κ/w˜ and thereby depends on the degree of progressiveness of the tax scheme. The stronger
the progressiveness in the tax scheme, the larger the increase in the after-tax wage rate and
thereby the greater the beneficial effects on employment and overall economic activity. We dot
not discuss further the impact effects which are similar to that described for revenue-neutral
strategies.
3.3 Output Response
We now investigate in details the response of output at an overall level and importantly at a
sectoral level. We denote by
∣∣j,k the effects of a fall in the labor tax by dτ j < 0 (j = F,H)
financed by a rise in τk (k = c,H).
3.3.1 GDP Response
We analyze first the response of GDP to highlight the role of trade balance. Using the fact
that in the long-run, overall output equalizes its demand counterpart, and differentiating, the
long-run GDP response is given by:20
dY˜
∣∣j,k = pcdc˜∣∣j,k + dn˜x∣∣j,k + p˜dI˜∣∣j,k > 0, (18)
where dx˜
∣∣j,k > 0 (with x˜ = c˜, I˜ , n˜x) is given by (15) or (17) depending on the type of the tax
reform. According to (18), the domestic demand boom for both consumption and investment
goods stimulates GDP. Furthermore, the improvement in the balance of trade to service the
20Using the market-clearing condition, i. e. Y˜
N
µ
= c˜N + gN + I˜, and the current account, i. e. Y˜ T =(
c˜T + gT
)− r?b˜, aggregating and differentiating, we get (18), keeping in mind that the steady-state level of the
relative price of non tradables remains unchanged.
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debt accumulated during the transition raises further Y˜ . In a closed economy framework, the
latter demand component vanishes. Hence, as stressed by Mendoza and Tesar [1998], a closed
economy model would underestimate the beneficial effects of a tax restructuring since the trade
balance surplus magnifies the effects of a tax reform on GDP in the long-run.
Linearizing aggregate demand for the domestic good, i. e. Y = pc(p(t))c(t) +(
gT + p(t)gN
)
+ p(t)I(t) + nx(t), evaluating at time t = 0 and differentiating enables us to
decompose the GDP response in its demand counterparts as follows:21
dY (0)
∣∣j,k = pcdc(0)∣∣j,k + p˜dI(0)∣∣j,k + Y˜ Ndp(0)∣∣j,k + dnx(0)∣∣j,k > 0, (19)
where dp(0)
∣∣j,k = 0 as long as kT > kN since the dynamics for the relative price degenerate
in this case. According to (19), the initial response of GDP is driven by the initial demand
boom for both consumption and investment goods. Yet, as reflected by the last term, the
trade balance deficit lowers the size of the GDP increase. As long as kT > kN , savings remain
unchanged. Hence, the worsening in the external asset position mirrors exactly the investment
boom. Consequently, the initial response of GDP is only driven by higher consumption. Since
consumption adjusts immediately to its long-run level, the short-run increase in GDP is smaller
than that in the long-run.22
3.3.2 Sectoral Output Responses
We now analyze if the traded and non traded sectors are affected uniformly by a tax reform.
Using the market-clearing condition together with the zero current account equation, we can
derive the steady-state changes of non traded and traded output, respectively:
1
µ
dY˜ N
∣∣j,k = dc˜N ∣∣j,k + dI˜∣∣j,k > 0, (20a)
dY˜ T
∣∣j,k = dn˜x∣∣j,k + dc˜T ∣∣j,k > 0. (20b)
Since a tax restructuring raises after-tax labor income and induces households to consume
more, demands for both traded and non traded consumption goods expand. Additionally,
higher investment in physical capital and net exports raise further non traded and traded
output, respectively. Interestingly, in the long-run, sectoral outputs are positively correlated.
More precisely, the larger the economic boom in the non traded sector, the more traded output
increases in the long-run. The explanation is that the greater the investment boom is, the
larger the accumulated debt and the more net exports must increase.
21An alternative way to determine the initial response of GDP is to use the fact that Y ≡ Y T + p
µ
Y N .
Keeping in mind that the capital stock is initially predetermined and differentiating, we obtain dY (0)
∣∣j,k =
wFdL(0)
∣∣j,k > 0. Since worked hours increase on impact, GDP rises in the short-run.
22In the case kN > kT , we reach similar conclusions since savings play little role as we consider time separable
preferences and we assume that the tax reform is permanent.
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We now evaluate if the sectoral outputs move in opposite direction. The sectoral output
responses in the short-run are:
1
µ
dY N (0)
∣∣j,k = dcN (0)∣∣j,k + dI(0)∣∣j,k > 0, (21a)
dY T (0)
∣∣j,k = dnx(0)∣∣j,k + dcT (0)∣∣j,k ≷ 0. (21b)
According to (21a), the demand boom for non tradables causes an expansion in the non traded
sector. With regard to the traded sector, the dramatic drop in net exports on impact now
counteracts the positive influence of higher consumption. If kT > kN , it can be proven ana-
lytically that traded output falls on impact. The intuitive explanation is that households get
richer due to a higher after-tax wage and greater labor supply. Hence, they are induced to
consume further. They raise cN and cT . But since the traded sector is more capital intensive,
it experiences a labor outflow on impact so that traded output declines. Hence, the rise in cT
reflects additional imports which results in a trade balance deficit.23
4 Tax Reforms: A Quantitative Exploration
In this section, we analyze the effects of tax reforms quantitatively. For this purpose we solve
the model numerically. In the following, we thus first discuss parameter values before turning
to the long-term and short-term effects of the tax substitutions.
4.1 Benchmark Parametrization
We start by describing the calibration of consumption-side parameters that we use as a baseline.
The world interest rate, which is constrained to equalize the subjective time discount rate β,
is chosen to be 3%. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution σc is set to 0.7 and the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution φ to 2 (see e.g. Cashin and Mc Dermott [2003]). One
critical parameter is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor supply σL. In our
baseline parametrization, we set σL = 0.5, in line with evidence reported by Domeij and Flode´n
[2006]. An additional critical parameter is ϕ which is set to 0.5 in the baseline calibration to
target a tradable content in total consumption expenditure (i.e., 1 − αc) of 50%. Below, we
conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to these two parameters, i.e. we set σL to 0.2 and
1, and ϕ to 0.1 and 0.9.24 For reason of space, we focus on the shift of employers’ labor taxes
(i.e. a fall in τF ) towards consumption tax (i.e. a rise in τ c) in evaluating the sensitivity of
numerical results to σL and ϕ.
23More precisely, physical capital accumulation requires a shift of resources towards the non traded sector.
Hence, traded output falls. Because consumption in traded good rises, additional demand yields higher imports.
24Raising ϕ from 0.1 to 0.9 increases the tradable share in GDP Y T /Y from 24% to 62%.
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We now describe the calibration of production-side parameters. We let physical capital to
depreciate at a rate δK = 4% to generate an investment-GDP ratio of 20% which is consistent
with data from developed countries. Sectoral capital income shares in output take two different
values depending on whether the traded sector is more or less capital intensive than the non
traded sector. In line with our estimates, when kT > kN , the values of θT and θN are set to 0.4
and 0.3 respectively. Alternatively, in the case kN > kT , we choose θT = 0.3 and θN = 0.4.25
The elasticity of substitution between varieties of non traded goods, ² is set to 3 to target
a markup of 1.5, in line with our estimates (see Appendix A). In the case of an endogenous
markup explored in section 6, keeping ² unchanged, we set the elasticity os substitution between
sectoral goods ω to 2 to target a markup of 1.5.
To set τ c, τF and τH , we estimated effective tax rates for thirteen OECD countries over
2000-2007. The consumption tax τ c is set to 13%, the employer’s part of labor taxes τF to 16%
and the wage income tax τH to 31%. In evaluating quantitatively the effects of a tax reform,
we consider a labor tax cut by 5 percentage points. Tax allowances κ is set to 0.3 to obtain
a share of taxable income into the gross wage earnings (w − κ)/w of 0.7. We set gN and gT
to target a non tradable share of government spending of 90% and government spending as a
share of GDP of 20%.
4.2 Long-Run Effects: A Quantitative Sectoral Decomposition
We now provide a quantitative exploration of the size of long-run effects.
4.2.1 Macroeconomic Effects
Using simple algebra, we have shown previously that long-term changes of consumption, em-
ployment and capital stock following a tax restructuring are a scaled-down version of the
steady-state changes following a lump-sum tax financing labor tax cut. For the baseline
parametrization, we find that the scaling-down term displays the same magnitude across the
types of tax reforms. More precisely, for our benchmark parametrization, Φj,k is equal to 0.25,
approximately. Hence, the size of the long-run effects are similar across the three tax reforms.26
As discussed in section 3, a tax restructuring stimulates both consumption and investment,
and improves the balance of trade. To disentangle the contribution to each GDP component
25θT = 0.4 and θN = 0.3 correspond approximately to average for countries with kT > kN (see Table 3). In
the case of reversal capital intensities, we consider symmetric values for θN and θT so that the gap between
sectoral capital intensities remain unchanged.
26For our baseline calibration, as the tax wedge is high and the tax scheme displays weak progressiveness
of tax progressiveness, a tax reform which involves cutting the wage income tax paid by households τH while
raising the consumption tax rate produces the larger effects on c, L,K.
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to the rise in overall output, we scaled steady-state changes of consumption, investment and
the balance of trade by initial GDP. Numerical results are summarized in Table 1B. We find
that two-third of the GDP growth is driven by the rise in consumption. The remaining share is
attributed to the steady-state improvement in the balance of trade and the investment boom.
4.2.2 GDP Response
Table 1D summarizes the numerical values for both overall and sectoral output responses. For
the benchmark parametrization, the steady-state response of GDP falls in the range between
0.26-0.30, depending on the tax reform which is implemented. More importantly, as emphasized
previously, sectoral outputs are positively correlated in the long-run. Interestingly, we find that
that tradable output expands more than non tradable output: Y˜ T rises by 0.15% of GDP while
Y˜ N increases by 0.11%. The sizeable expansion in the traded sector relies upon the long-run
improvement in the balance of trade. While the tradable share in overall output is about 40%,
its contribution to GDP increase is close to 60%.
4.3 Impact Effects: A Quantitative Sectoral Decomposition
The sectoral decomposition of the effects of a tax restructuring allows to highlight the prop-
agation mechanism. The impact responses of sectoral outputs are summarized in the second
and third line of Table 1E. Interestingly, sectoral outputs vary in opposite direction in the
short-run. More precisely, the increase in non traded output is four times larger than that of
GDP and falls between 0.67% and 0.79% of initial GDP approximately, depending on the tax
restructuring which is implemented. By contrast, the traded sector experiences a severe decline
in its output which falls between 0.5% and 0.59% of initial GDP approximately. The reason
for opposite responses in sectoral output stems from the shift of resources across sectors. The
initial stimulus of hours worked shifts resources from the traded towards the non traded sector
which is labor intensive. In the same time, households consume more due to higher after-tax
labor income. While tradable output decreases, about half of the additional income is devoted
to imports which causes a current account deficit. In section 5.1, we find that sectoral outputs
also vary in opposite direction in the case of reversal capital intensities, i.e. kN > kT .
4.4 Dynamics Effects
We now investigate the dynamic effects. Computed transitional paths of key variables are
displayed in Figures 2 where we consider a shift of the tax burden from labor taxes (i. e. a cut
in τF ) to consumption taxes (i. e. a rise in τ c). Investment and the current account are scaled
by initial GDP while sectoral outputs are expressed as deviations from initial steady-state
16
values scaled by initial GDP (in percentage). Reactions of sectoral employment are scaled by
initial total employment.
As illustrated in Figures 2(b)-2(c), employment increases by about 0.7% in the non traded
sector which boosts Y N by 0.67%. Conversely, the traded sector experiences a labor outflow by
almost -0.5% which drives down its output by 0.5%. As shown in Figure 2(a), the labor inflow
in the non traded sector triggers an investment boom which drives the current account into
deficit in the short-run by -0.5% of GDP. As the economy accumulates physical capital over the
transition, the traded sector which is more capital intensive expands. As displayed in Figures
2(b)-2(c), the investment boom shifts resources towards the traded sector so that employment
and thereby output rises in that sector. After 3 years, traded output exceeds its initial level and
converges towards a new higher steady-state level. While the initial boom in the non traded
sector slows down, the rate of growth remains positive over the entire adjustment.
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
As expected, the size of labor supply responsiveness exerts a sizeable effect on steady-state GDP
response and GDP components. As σL is raised from 0.2 and 1, the GDP response increases
from 0.08% to 0.48% approximately. By contrast, raising the tradable share of consumption
by increasing ϕ does not modify significantly the long-run GDP response. The reason is that
the relative price remains unchanged in the long-run.
Interestingly, labor supply also affects significantly the contribution of traded output to the
long-run GDP expansion. While setting σL to 0.2 implies that half of the GDP growth can be
attributed to the traded sector, its contribution is close to 60% if σL is set to 1. The reason
is that, as labor supply gets more responsive, the traded sector experiences a greater labor
outflow on impact which triggers a larger current account deficit. Hence, net exports must
increase more in the long-run which boosts further Y˜ T .
Additionally, increasing the tradable good content (i.e. raising ϕ) plays a significant role in
driving the size of the long-term responses of sectoral outputs. Setting ϕ = 0.9 implies that the
growth in traded output contributes to 80% of GDP increase. The reason is that consumption
in the traded good expands by a larger amount which magnifies the increase in Y˜ T . Since
GDP growth is unaffected by the value of ϕ, a rise in the traded good content shifts resources
towards the traded good sector.
Finally, raising σL amplifies considerably the heterogeneity in sectoral output responses
in the short-run. Increasing σL from 0.2 to 1, the decline in Y T becomes more pronounced
(-0.90% against -0.16%) and the rise in Y N gets larger (1.20% against 0.21%). Because the
relative price remains unchanged, raising ϕ does not modify significantly the magnitude of
17
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Figure 2: Transitional Paths after a Labor-Consumption Tax Restructuring (Fixed Markup)
sectoral output responses.
5 A more Capital Intensive Non Traded Sector
So far, we have assumed that the traded sector was more capital intensive than the non traded
sector, as it is commonly assumed in the two-sector theoretical literature for analytical con-
venience. Yet, our estimation of sectoral shares of capital income in output show that half of
industrialized countries displays a non traded sector which is more capital intensive. Given
its empirical relevance and for robustness purpose, we analyze to which extent our results are
modified by considering that the non traded sector is more capital intensive. Such an analysis
allows us to test if the non traded sector still benefits the labor tax cut in the short-run, even
if it is more capital intensive. Furthermore, we evaluate the sensitivity of our numerical results
to the tradable share in consumption expenditure and labor supply responsiveness.
5.1 The Role of Sectoral Capital Intensities
Assuming that kN > kT implies that the dynamics for p do no longer degenerate. Rather, the
relative price p must rise on impact as the result of higher demand for non tradables and decline
along the transitional path to equalize the returns on domestic and foreign assets. Since the
temporal path of the relative price is no longer flat, transitional dynamics for consumption and
labor are restored. Importantly, the non traded sector experiences a labor outflow which shifts
towards the more labor intensive sector. Because the relative price of non tradables strongly
appreciates on impact, the consecutive shift of resources triggers an investment boom. With
regard to the long-term GDP response, Table 1D shows that the results are weakly sensitive
to sectoral capital intensities.
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5.2 Tradable Share
In contrast to the case kT > kN , short-run sectoral output responses are sensitive to the
tradable content in consumption expenditure. More precisely, raising ϕ moderates significantly
the heterogeneity of output responses across sectors. As summarized in the second line of Table
1E, traded output falls by about -0.67% on impact if the tradable content is low (i.e. ϕ is set
to 0.1) whereas its decline is less severe if ϕ is set to 0.9. The reason is that as the share of
tradables in consumption expenditure increases, the excess of demand in the non traded good
market gets smaller. Consequently, the relative price of non tradables appreciates by a lower
amount which in turn moderates both the decline in Y T and the rise in Y N . Yet, the short-run
response of GDP remains unaffected by ϕ.
5.3 Labor Supply responsiveness
As in the case kT > kN , the elasticity of labor supply σL plays a major role in determining the
size of both GDP and sectoral output responses in the long-run. Increasing σL from 0.2 to 1
raises the long-run GDP response from 0.12% to 0.47% approximately, as shown in Table 1D.
To have further insight, we conduct a sensitivity analysis with respect to σL which is allowed
to vary from 0.1 to 2. Figure 3(a) plots both the long-run and initial response of GDP against
σL while Figure 3(b) plots both traded and non traded output impact responses against the
sensitivity of labor supply.
As illustrated in Figure 3(a), like Baxter et King [1993] who use a one-sector model, the
GDP response in the long-run rises with σL. As labor gets more sensitive to the rise in the after-
tax labor income, the non traded sector experiences a larger labor outflow. The consecutive
greater excess of demand for non tradables requires a larger increase in the stock of capital
to clear the non traded good market. Yet, unlike Baxter and King [1993], the relationship
between the short-run response of GDP and the elasticity of labor supply displays a hump-
shaped pattern. This non monotonic relationship can be best understood by using a sectoral
decomposition. Interestingly, Figure 3(b) shows that, as labor supply gets more responsive,
non traded output rises more whereas traded output declines further. The explanation is as
follows. As labor supply is more responsive, the excess of demand in the non traded good
market gets larger, so that the relative price of non tradables appreciates more on impact. The
larger increase in p raises further Y N but lowers Y T more. As long as σL > 1, raising labor
supply responsiveness implies that the larger decline in traded output more than offsets the
stronger increase in non traded output which results in a smaller rise in GDP, as shown in
Figure 3(a).
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Figure 3: Sensitivity of Output Responses to Labor Supply Responsiveness
6 Endogenous Markups and Sectoral Effects of Tax Reforms
Recently, several papers have stressed that the variation in the number of competitors and the
consecutive change in the markup provides an important magnification mechanism, see e.g.
Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008], Wu and Zhang [2000], Zhang [2007] who consider one-sector
models. We thus investigate the sectoral effects of tax reforms by allowing for the markup to
be endogenous.27
6.1 Steady-state Effects
So far, we adopted the Dixit-Stiglitz assumption according to which the number of competitors
is large enough within each sector to yield a fixed price-elasticity of demand. Yet, as emphasized
by Yang and Heijdra [1993], the assumption of Dixit and Stiglitz [1977] is an approximation
when the final good is aggregated by a finite number of intermediate goods. We depart from
the usual practice, following Gal´ı [1994], in assuming that the number of firms is large enough
so that we can ignore the strategic effects but not so large that the effect of entry is minuscule
on the firm’s demand curve. Consequently, the price elasticity of demand faced by a single firm
is no longer constant and equal to the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties, but
rather a function of the number of firms N . Taking into account that output of one variety
does not affect the general price index p, but influences the sectoral price level, in a symmetric
equilibrium, the resulting price elasticity of demand writes as:28
e (N) = ²− (²− ω)
N
, N ∈ (1,∞) . (22)
Assuming that ² > ω, the price elasticity of demand faced by one single firm is an increasing
function of the number of firms N within a sector. Henceforth, the markup µ = ee−1 decreases
27We assume that the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector for clarity purpose.
Numerical results for the case kN > kT are available upon request.
28Details of derivation can be found in the Appendix.
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as the number of competitors increases.
In the interest of space, we restrict attention to the major changes in deriving the macroe-
conomic equilibrium. First, the zero-profit condition in the intermediate good sector can be
solved for the number of firms, i.e. N = N (K,L, p). Keeping in mind that µ = µ (N), equali-
ties of marginal products between sectors (6) imply that capital-labor ratios kj (j = T,N) are
affected by the markup and thereby the number of firms, i.e. kj = kj (p, µ). Substituting the
capital-labor ratios into the sectoral marginal products of labor and the resource constraints,
we obtain the short-run static solutions for the wage rate and sectoral outputs:
w = w
(
p, τF , µ
)
, Y T = Y T (K, p, L, µ) , Y N = Y N (K, p, L, µ) . (23)
The wage rate and sectoral output are now affected by a competition effect triggered by the
change in the markup. A larger number of firms N lowers the markup µ which increases the
wage rate (since we assume that kT > kT ). Because households raise labor supply, non traded
output Y N increases while traded output Y T falls.
Let now discuss how the change of the markup affects the steady-state effects of a tax reform.
First, the markup depends on the number of firms which adjusts to drive profits to zero, i.e.
Y˜ N
(
1− 1
µ(N˜)
)
= N˜χ where χ represents the fixed costs. In the light of our discussion in
section 3.3, a tax reform raises non traded output. Hence, average cost falls which thereby
fosters firms’ entry. A higher number of firms reduces the markup. A lower µ leads to a
long-run fall in the relative price of non tradables p, regardless of sectoral capital intensities, to
equalize the rates of return on domestic and foreign assets, i.e. θN
(
k˜N
)θN−1
/µ
(
N˜
)
−δK = r?.
Inspection of eqs. (23) which hold at the steady-state, reveals that changes in the relative price
and in the markup impinge on sectoral outputs. The decline in the relative price shifts resources
away from the non traded towards the traded sector. Yet, the competition effect reflected by
a fall in the markup counteracts the relative price effect. Numerically, we find that these two
effects offset so that long-run sectoral effects remain similar to those found in the case of fixed
markup.29
6.2 Impact Effects: A Sectoral Decomposition
We now investigate the short-term effects in the case of an endogenous markup. Interestingly,
while the competition channel does not modify the long-run GDP response as the relative price
effect works in opposite direction, the fall in the markup exerts sizeable effects in the short-run,
in particular on sectoral outputs.
As the non traded output overshoots its steady-state level on impact which lowers signifi-
cantly average cost, the number of firms initially shoots up before slowly converging towards
29Numerical results for long-term effects of a tax reform in the case of an endogenous markup are available
on request.
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Figure 4: Transitional Paths after a Labor-Consumption Tax Restructuring (Endogenous
Markup)
its new higher steady-state value. The consecutive drop in µ is large enough to foster further
capital accumulation, though the initial decline in the relative price of non tradables works in
opposite direction of the competition channel. As reported in Table 2A, the investment boom is
almost two times larger than in the case of fixed markup, i.e. rises from 0.6% to 1.1% of initial
GDP. Additionally, individuals are more willing to supply labor because the substantial drop
in the markup raises the wage rate. While the open economy experiences a larger investment
boom, the GDP response is similar to that in the case of fixed markup since the balance of
trade enters in a greater deficit.
Table 2: Quantitative Effects of Tax Reforms (Endogenous Markup - kT > kN )
Benchmark Sensitivity analysis
Rev-Neut Const. τM Labor Supply
dτF dτH dτF σL = 0.2 σL = 1
A.Impact Effects
Labor, dL(0) 0.29 0.34 0.29 0.08 0.55
Real Wage, dw(0) 4.40 -0.15 4.40 4.47 4.33
Output, dY (0) 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.05 0.36
Consumption, dc(0) 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.05 0.31
Investment, dI(0) 1.10 1.29 1.13 0.37 1.97
Net Exports, dnx(0) -1.04 -1.21 -1.06 -0.35 -1.84
B.Sect. Decomp. Impact
dY (0) 0.19 0.22 0.19 0.05 0.36
dY T (0) -0.93 -1.08 -0.95 -0.31 -1.65
dY N (0) 1.12 1.30 0.14 0.36 2.01
Interestingly, as summarized in Table 2B, the fall in the markup magnifies considerably the
heterogeneity in sectoral output responses on impact. As discussed previously, considering an
endogenous markup into the analysis amplifies substantially the investment boom. Moreover,
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the fall in p induces agents to consume more of the non traded good. By stimulating further
the demand for non tradables, a tax restructuring raises non traded output by 1.1% instead
of 0.7% in the case of fixed markup. In the same time, the greater deficit in the balance of
trade results in a larger decline in traded output. As illustrated in Figure 4(c), the drop in the
markup amplifies the sectoral output responses.
Over time, firms’ entry slows down. The relative price of non tradables appreciates to
equalize the rate of return between domestic and foreign assets. The increase in p along
the transitional path lowers cN and raises cT over time. As depicted in Figure 4(b), capital
accumulation shifts employment away from the non traded sector towards the traded sector, as
in the case of fixed markup. As time passes, the gap between sectoral output growth shrinks, as
illustrated in Figure 4(c). The intersectoral reallocations are strong enough to raise the traded
output growth above the non traded output growth in the long-run. The same explanation
developed in the case of fixed markup applies. The open economy finances the investment
boom along the transitional path by a current account deficit which must be matched by an
improvement in the trade balance in the long-run. Such a rise in net exports is achieved though
the increase in Y T originating from a labor inflow after about 3 years.
7 Conclusion
We used a two-sector small open economy producing both traded and non traded goods to
investigate the short-run and long-run effects of three tax restructuring. We consider two
budget-neutral strategies that shifts the payroll or personal labor income taxes to consump-
tion taxes and one strategy keeping the marginal tax wedge constant that reduces the taxes
paid by employers and raises the taxes paid by employees. Our conclusions confirm earlier
findings reached by Mendoza and Tesar [1998]: cutting the labor income tax and raising the
consumption tax, leaving unchanged the government budget, crowds-in both consumption and
investment, and raises employment and GDP.
Our paper also complements earlier studies by investigating the sectoral effects of tax
reforms. We find that traded and non traded outputs are negatively correlated in the short-
run but are positively correlated in the long-run. The reason is that the open economy finances
capital investment without lowering consumption by running a current account deficit. While
the investment boom raises sharply non traded output in the short-run, the fall in net exports
triggers a significant decline in traded output on impact. As sectoral outputs move in opposite
direction over the transition, a tax reform has a small impact on GDP. In the long-run, the
open economy runs a trade balance surplus to service the debt accumulated over the transition.
As resources shifts towards the traded sector, output in that sector increases. Interestingly, for
the baseline calibration, roughly 60% of GDP growth originates from the expansion in traded
output.
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Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis shows that raising the elasticity of labor supply signifi-
cantly amplifies responses of sectoral outputs both in the short-run and the long-run, regardless
of sectoral capital intensities. While traded output falls by a larger amount on impact as labor
supply responsiveness rises, output in the traded sector increases more in the long-run. We
also find that raising the tradable content in consumption expenditure lowers substantially
the magnitude of sectoral output responses, as long as the non traded sector is more capital
intensive, since in this case the relative price of non tradables increases less.
Building on Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008], we endogenize the markup charged by the
non traded sector. Numerical results reveal that the short-run fall in the markup amplifies
considerably sectoral output responses by stimulating further investment and triggering a larger
current account deficit. Yet, the response of GDP remains almost unaffected.
A Data
We split the overall economy into a traded and non traded sector. Table 3 reports the non trad-
able share of GDP, employment, consumption expenditure, and gross fixed capital formation
for 13 OECD countries. The choice of these countries has been dictated by data availability.
We follow the methodology proposed by De Gregorio et al. [1994], who treat Agriculture,
Hunting, Forestry and Fishing, Mining and Quarrying, Total Manufacturing, Transport and
Storage and Communication as traded goods. Electricity, Gas and Water Supply, Construc-
tion, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants, Finance, Insurance, Real Estate
and Business Services, Community Social and Personal Services are classified as non traded
sectors.
With regard to investment, we follow the methodology proposed by Burstein et al. [2004]
who treat Housing and Other Construction as non tradable investment and Products of agricul-
ture, forestry, fisheries and aquaculture, Metal products and machinery, Transport Equipment
as tradable investment expenditure (source: OECD Input-Output database).
For reason of space, we did not report the non tradable share of government spending which
averages to 90% for the countries of our sample. Sectoral government expenditure data over the
period 1978-2004 were obtained from the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and OECD
database. Following Morshed and Turnovsky [2004], the following four sectors were treated as
traded: Fuel and Energy; Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting; Mining, Manufacturing,
and Construction; Transport and Communications. The following sectors were treated as
being non traded: Government Public Services; Defense; Public Order and Safety; Education;
Health; Social Security and Welfare; Housing and Community Amenities; Recreation Cultural
and Community Affairs.
Markups are estimated at the industry level for each country, classified as non traded
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sectors, and are aggregated as follows to construct µ:
µ =
6∑
j=1
ωj µˆj , (24)
where ωj is the nominal value added-weight of industry j in the non traded sector. Estimates
µˆj are obtained by applying the consistent methodology developed by Roeger [1995]. Inputs
are labor, capital and intermediate; variables required to apply the Roeger’s method are the
following: gross output (at basic current prices), compensation of employees, intermediate
inputs at current purchasers prices, and capital services (volume) indices. The testable equation
of the Roeger’s methodology may be written as:
yj,t = βj xj,t + εj,t, (25)
with yt = ∆(pj,tYj,t) − αN,t∆(wj,tLj,t) − αM,t∆(mj,tMj,t) − (1− αN,t − αM,t)∆ (rtKj,t),
xj,t = ∆(pj,tYj,t) − ∆(rtKj,t), and εj,t the i.i.d. error term. ∆ (pj,tYj,t) denotes the nomi-
nal output growth in industry j, ∆ (wj,tLj,t) the nominal labor cost growth, ∆ (mj,tMj,t) the
growth in nominal intermediate input costs and ∆ (rtKj,t) the nominal capital cost growth.
All these variables are compiled from the EU KLEMS database, with the exception of the
user cost of capital rt. No sector-specific information was available to construct rt; hence, the
rental price of capital is calculated as rt(≡ rj,t) = pI (i− piGDP + δK), with pI the deflator
for business non residential investment, i the long-term nominal interest rate, piGDP the GDP
deflator based inflation rate; the rate of depreciation δ is set to 5%; pI , i and piGDP were taken
from OECD database. An econometric issue arises when estimating (232) with the OLS is the
potential endogeneity of the regressor associated with the heteroskedasticity and autocorrela-
tion of the error term. To tackle these problems, we estimated (232) by using heteroskedastic
and autocorrelation consistent standard errors as suggested by Newey and West [1993] (lag
truncation =2). Finally, the markup estimate µˆj is equal to 1/(1− βˆj).30 Results are reported
in Table 3.
To estimate the tax rates of consumption and labor, we use the OECD database. We split
labor taxes into employee’s and employer’s part of labor taxes. Payroll tax, personal income
tax, and consumption tax are effective tax rates and are computed according to the following
formulas:
τF =
Taxes on payroll and workforce + Employers’ contribution to social security
Compensation of employees
,
τH = Income tax (average rate) + Employees’ social security contributions (average rate),
τ c =
Taxes on production, sale, transfer
Final consumption expenditure of households and general government
.
30Countries estimates for each µˆj , j = 1, ..., 11, are not reported here to save space, but are available upon
request.
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Table 3: Data to Calibrate the Two-Sector Model
Countries Non tradable Share Capital Share Markup Taxes
Y N/Y LN/L cN/c IN/I θT θN µ τ c τF τH (w − κ)/w
Austria 0.65 0.60 0.44 0.59 0.28 0.32 1.52 0.16 0.16 0.32 0.77
Belgium 0.67 0.65 0.44 n.d. 0.33 0.35 1.39 0.11 0.20 0.42 0.80
Denmark 0.70 0.67 0.43 0.58 0.32 0.32 1.52 0.21 0.00 0.42 0.88
Spain 0.61 0.59 0.44 0.63 0.35 0.26 1.37 0.12 0.22 0.20 0.66
Finland 0.58 0.57 0.40 0.63 0.27 0.30 1.41 0.19 0.23 0.32 0.93
France 0.69 0.64 0.44 0.61 0.22 0.35 1.42 0.14 0.27 0.29 0.60
Germany 0.64 0.61 0.36 0.54 0.22 0.33 1.55 0.13 0.15 0.44 0.92
Italy 0.63 0.56 0.39 0.59 0.42 0.39 1.73 0.13 0.27 0.28 0.82
Japan 0.64 0.61 0.45 0.63 0.37 0.29 1.63 0.06 0.08 0.19 0.50
Netherlands 0.67 0.69 0.50 0.64 0.41 0.33 1.36 0.15 0.09 0.33 0.96
Sweden 0.65 0.67 0.51 0.47 0.30 0.30 1.44 0.17 0.23 0.31 0.94
UK 0.62 0.66 0.52 0.52 0.30 0.28 1.47 0.13 0.07 0.26 0.83
US 0.68 0.72 0.49 0.59 0.36 0.32 1.42 0.05 0.06 0.25 0.78
Notes: Y N/Y , LN/L, cN/c and IN/I are the non tradable share in GDP, employment, consumption, and gross
fixed capital formation; θj is the GDP share of capital income in sector j = T,N ; µ is the markup charged in the
non traded sector; τ c is the consumption tax rate, τF the employers’ part of labor taxes, and τH : the employees’
part of labor taxes. Source: IMF [2007], OECD [2008a], [2008a], United Nations [2007] and EU KLEMS [2007].
Tax allowances, κ, are calculated as the share of taxable income into the gross wage earnings
before taxes.
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SECTORAL EFFECTS OF TAX REFORMS IN AN
OPEN ECONOMY
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Olivier CARDI and Romain RESTOUT
A Short-Run Static Solutions
A.1 Short-Run Static Solutions for Consumption-Side
Since c (.) is homothetic, the household’s maximization problem can be decomposed into two
stages. In the first stage, households choose their real consumption, c, labor supply L, and
the rates of accumulation of traded bonds b together with domestic capital K by maximizing
(2) subject to the flow budget constraints (3) and (4), and initial conditions b(0) = b0 and
K(0) = K0:31
uc (c) = pc (p) (1 + τ c)λ, (26a)
vL (L) = −λ
[
w − (w − κ) τH] , (26b)
λ˙ = λ (β − r?) , (26c)
rK
p
+
p˙
p
= r?, (26d)
where λ is the co-state variable associated with dynamic equation (3).
Static efficiency conditions (26a) and (26b) can be solved for real consumption and labor
which of course must hold at any point of time:
c = c
(
λ¯, p, τ c
)
, L = L
(
λ¯, p, τF , τH , µ
)
, (27)
with
cλ¯ =
∂c
∂λ¯
= −σc c
λ¯
< 0, (28a)
cp =
∂c
∂p
= −αcσc c
p
< 0, (28b)
cτc =
∂c
∂τ c
= −σc c(1 + τ c) < 0, (28c)
Lλ¯ =
∂L
∂λ¯
= σL
L
λ¯
> 0, (28d)
Lp =
∂L
∂p
= σLL
wp
(
1− τH)
wA
= −σLL Λ
wF
kTh
µ (kN − kT ) ≶ 0, (28e)
LτF =
∂L
∂τF
= −σLL
wτF
(
1− τH)
wA
= −σLL Λ(1 + τF ) < 0, (28f)
LτH =
∂L
∂τH
= −σLL(w − κ)
wA
< 0, (28g)
Lµ =
∂L
∂µ
= σLL
wµ
(
1− τH)
wA
= σLL
Λ
wF
kT ph
(µ)2 (kN − kT ) ≷ 0, (28h)
where σc = − ucuccc > 0 corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for con-
sumption, σL = vLvLLL > 0 represents the intertemporal elasticity for labor. We denoted by
31The transversality conditions are:
lim
t→∞
p(t)K(t)e−r
?t = lim
t→∞
b(t)e−r
?t = 0.
0 < Λ ≡ (1−τ
H)[
(1−τH)+ τHκ
w
] < 1 as longer as κ > 0; if κ = 0, then Λ = 1. According to (28f), labor
supply decreases or increases following a real exchange rate appreciation depending on wether
kN ≷ kT .
According to (28), a rise in agent’s wealth reflected by a fall in the shadow value of of
wealth λ¯ stimulates consumption while discouraging labor supply. By raising the cost of living,
a rise in the relative price of non tradables p lowers c. The wage rate w and thereby labor
supply is lowered or raised following an increase in p depending on whether kN ≷ kT . While a
rise in the consumption tax rate τ c depresses consumption by raising its marginal cost, a fall
in the labor income tax rate levied on employers τF or employees τH stimulates labor supply
by raising the after-tax labor income.
Denoting by φ the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between the tradable and the
non tradable good and inserting short-run solution for consumption (27) into intra-temporal
allocations between non tradable and tradable goods, we solve for cT and cN :
cT = cT
(
λ¯, p, τ c
)
, cN = cN
(
λ¯, p, τ c
)
, (29)
with
cTλ¯ = −σc
cT
λ¯
< 0, (30a)
cTp = αc
cT
p
(φ− σc) ≶ 0, (30b)
cTτc = −σc
cT
(1 + τ c)
< 0, (30c)
cNλ¯ = −σc
cN
λ¯
< 0, (30d)
cNp = −
cN
p
[(1− αc)φ+ αcσc] < 0, (30e)
cNτc = −σc
cN
(1 + τ c)
< 0, (30f)
where we used the fact that −p′′c pp′c = φ (1− αc) > 0 and p
′
cc = c
N .
A.2 Short-Run Static Solutions for Production-Side
Capital-Labor Ratios
¿From static optimality conditions (6a) and (6b), we may express sector capital-labor ratios
as functions of the real exchange rate:
kT = kT (p, µ) , kN = kN (p, µ) , (31)
33
with
kTp =
∂kT
∂p
=
h
µfkk (kN − kT ) , (32a)
kTµ =
∂kT
∂µ
= − ph
(µ)2 fkk (kN − kT )
, (32b)
kNp =
∂kN
∂p
=
µf
p2hkk (kN − kT ) . (32c)
kNµ =
∂kN
∂µ
= − f
phkk (kN − kT ) . (32d)
Wage
Equality
[
f
(
kT
)− kT fk (kT )] ≡ wF can be solved for the wage rate:
w = w
(
p, τF , µ
)
, (33)
with
wp =
∂w
∂p
= −k
T fkkk
T
p
(1 + τF )
= − k
T
(1 + τF )
h
µ (kN − kT ) ≶ 0, (34a)
wτF =
∂w
∂τF
= − w
(1 + τF )
< 0, (34b)
wµ = −∂w
∂µ
= −k
T fkkk
T
µ
(1 + τF )
=
kT
(1 + τF )
ph
(µ)2 (kN − kT ) ≷ 0. (34c)
Labor
Substituting short-run static solutions for labor (27) and capital-labor ratios (31) into the
resource constraints for capital and labor (7), we can solve for traded and non traded labor as
follows:
LT = LT
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH , µ
)
, LN = LN
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH , µ
)
, (35)
34
with
LTK =
∂LT
∂K
=
1
kT − kN ≶ 0, (36a)
LTp =
∂LT
∂p
=
1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
LTh
fkk
+
µ2LNf
p2hkk
− σLL Λ
wF
kTkNh
]
< 0, (36b)
LTµ =
∂LT
∂µ
= − 1
[µ (kN − kT )]2
[
LT ph
fkk
+
µ2LNf
phkk
− σLL Λ
wF
kTkNph
]
> 0, (36c)
LTλ¯ =
∂LT
∂λ¯
= σL
L
λ¯
kN
kN − kT ≷ 0, (36d)
LTτF =
∂LT
∂τF
= − k
N
kN − kT σLL
Λ
(1 + τF )
≶ 0, (36e)
LTτH =
∂LT
∂τH
= − k
N
kN − kT σLL
(w − κ)
wA
≶ 0, (36f)
LNK =
∂LN
∂K
=
1
kN − kT ≷ 0, (36g)
LNp =
∂LN
∂p
= − 1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
LTh
fkk
+
µ2LNf
p2hkk
− σLL Λ
wF
(
kT
)2
h
]
> 0, (36h)
LNµ =
∂LN
∂µ
=
1
[µ (kN − kT )]2
[
LT ph
fkk
+
µ2LNf
phkk
− σLL Λ
wF
(
kT
)2
ph
]
< 0, (36i)
LNλ¯ =
∂LN
∂λ¯
= −σLL
λ¯
kT
kN − kT ≶ 0, (36j)
LNτF =
∂LT
∂τF
=
kT
kN − kT σLL
Λ
(1 + τF )
≷ 0, (36k)
LNτH =
∂LN
∂τH
=
kT
kN − kT σLL
(w − κ)
wA
≷ 0, (36l)
where wF = w
(
1 + τF
)
. From (36a) and (36g), when the capital stock rises, labor must shift
to the sector which is relatively more capital intensive. From (36b) and (36h), a rise in the
relative price of non tradable goods (lowers the capital-labor ratios) causes a shift of labor from
the traded to the non-traded sector, irrespective of the sectoral capital intensities. From (36d)
and (36j), an increase in the marginal utility of wealth raises the labor supplied by households
which leads to a shift of labor to the sector which is relatively less capital capital intensive.
From (36e)-(36f) and (36k)-(36l), a rise in the tax rate τF paid by firms or an increase in the
tax rate τH paid by households reduces unambiguously total employment L which leads to a
shift of labor towards the sector which is relatively more capital intensive.
Output
Inserting short-run static solutions for capital-labor ratios (31) and for labor (36) into the
production functions, we can solve for the traded, Y T = LTkT , and the non traded output,
Y N = LNhN :
Y T = Y T
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH , µ
)
, Y N = Y N
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH , µ
)
, (37)
35
with
Y TK =
∂Y T
∂K
= − f
kN − kT ≶ 0, (38a)
Y Tp =
∂Y T
∂p
=
1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
pLT (h)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
(p)2 hkk
− σLL Λ
wF
kTkNhf
]
< 0, (38b)
Y Tµ =
∂Y T
∂µ
= − 1
[µ (kN − kT )]2
[
LT (ph)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
phkk
− σLL Λ
wF
kTkNphf
]
> 0,(38c)
Y Tλ¯ =
∂Y T
∂λ¯
= σL
L
λ¯
kNf
kN − kT ≷ 0, (38d)
Y TτF =
∂Y T
∂τF
= − k
Nf
kN − kT σLL
Λ
(1 + τF )
≶ 0, (38e)
Y TτH =
∂Y T
∂τH
= − k
Nf
kN − kT σLL
(w − κ)
wA
≶ 0, (38f)
Y NK =
∂Y N
∂K
=
h
kN − kT ≷ 0, (38g)
Y Np =
∂Y N
∂p
= − 1
p (kN − kT )2
[
pLT (h)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
p2hkk
− p
µ
σLL
Λ
wF
(
kTh
)2]
> 0. (38h)
Y Nµ =
∂Y N
∂µ
=
1
µ (kN − kT )2
[
pLT (h)2
µfkk
+
LN (µf)2
p2hkk
− p
µ
σLL
Λ
wF
(
kTh
)2]
< 0, (38i)
Y Nλ¯ =
∂Y N
∂λ¯
= −σLL
λ¯
kTh
kN − kT ≶ 0, (38j)
Y NτF =
∂Y N
∂τF
=
kTh
kN − kT σLL
Λ
(1 + τF )
≷ 0, (38k)
Y NτH =
∂Y N
∂τH
=
kTh
kN − kT σLL
(w − κ)
wA
≷ 0. (38l)
¿From (38b) and (38h), an appreciation in the real exchange rate attracts resources from the
traded to the non traded sector which in turn raises the output of the latter. From (38a) and
(38g), a rise in the capital stock raises the output of the sector which is relatively more capital
intensive. From (38d) and (38j), an increase in the marginal utility of wealth lowers the output
in the sector which is relatively less capital intensive. From (38e)-(38f) and (38k)-(38l), higher
wage taxes, whatever they are levied on employers or employees depress total employment and
favor the output in the sector which is relatively more capital intensive. As it will be useful to
calculate fiscal multipliers, we give the partial derivatives of output in the traded and the non
traded sector w. r. t. total employment:
Y TL =
∂Y T
∂L
=
kNf
kN − kT ≷ 0, Y
N
L =
∂Y N
∂L
= − k
Th
kN − kT ≶ 0. (39)
Useful Properties
36
Making use of (38b) and (38h), (38a) and (38g), we deduce the following useful properties:
Y Tp + p
Y Np
µ
= −σLLΛ k
Th
µ (kN − kT ) ≶ 0, (40a)
µY TK + pY
N
K =
µf − ph
kT − kN = phk = µfk, (40b)
Y TL + p
Y NL
µ
= wF , (40c)
Y Tµ + p
Y Nµ
µ
= σLLΛkT
ph
µ2 (kN − kT ) ≷ 0, (40d)
Y Tλ¯ + p
Y N
λ¯
µ
= σL
L
λ¯
(
kNµf − kT ph)
µ (kN − kT ) = σL
L
λ¯
wF > 0, (40e)
Y TτF + p
Y N
τF
µ
= −σLLwΛ < 0, (40f)
Y TτH + p
Y N
τH
µ
= −σLL(w − κ)
wA
wF < 0, (40g)
where we used the fact that µf ≡ p [h− hk (kN − kT )] and kNµf − kT ph =
p
(
h− hKkN) (kN − kT ) = µwF (kN − kT ).
In addition, using the fact that rK = fk
[
kT (p, µ)
]
, the rental rate of capital denoted by
rK can be expressed as a function of the real exchange rate p and the mark-up µ:
rK = rK (p, µ) , (41)
with partial derivatives given by:
rKp ≡
∂rK
∂p
=
h
µ (kN − kT ) ≷ 0, (42a)
rµp ≡
∂rK
∂µ
= − ph
µ2 (kN − kT ) ≶ 0. (42b)
B Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
Inserting short-run static solutions (27), (29) and (37) into (26d) and (9), we obtain:
K˙ =
1
µ
Y N
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH
)− cN (λ¯, p, τ c)− δKK − gN , (43a)
p˙ = p
[
r? + δK − hk (p)
µ
]
. (43b)
Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting x˜ = K˜, p˜ the long-term
values of x = K, p, we obtain in a matrix form:(
K˙, p˙
)T
= J
(
K(t)− K˜, p(t)− p˜
)T
, (44)
where J is given by
J ≡
 b11 b12
b21 b22
 , (45)
37
with
b11 =
Y NK
µ
− δK = h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK ≷ 0, b12 = Y Np
µ
− cNp > 0, (46a)
b21 = 0, b22 = −p˜
hkkk
N
p
µ
= − f˜
p˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) = Y TK
p˜
≶ 0. (46b)
Equilibrium Dynamics
By denoting ν the eigenvalue of matrix J, the characteristic equation for the matrix of the
linearized system (44) can be written as follows:
ν2 − 1
p˜
(
Y TK +
p˜
µ˜
Y NK − δK p˜
)
ν +
Y TK
p˜
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)
= 0. (47)
The determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 2 × 2 matrix (44) is unambiguously
negative:32
Det J = b11b22 =
Y TK
p˜
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)
= − f˜ h˜
µp˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
)2 − δK Y TKp˜ < 0, (48)
and the trace denoted by Tr given by
Tr J = b11 + b22 =
1
p˜
(
Y TK +
p˜
µ˜
Y NK
)
−−δK = hk
µ
− δK = r? > 0, (49)
where we used the fact that at the long-run equilibrium hkµ = r
? + δK .
¿From (44), the characteristic root obtained from J writes as follows:
νi ≡ 12
r? ±
√
(r?)2 − 4Y
T
K
p˜
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
) ≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (50)
Using (49), then (50) can be rewritten as follows:
νi ≡ 12
{
r? ±
[
Y TK
p˜
−
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)]}
≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (51)
We denote by ν1 < 0 and ν2 > 0 the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying
ν1 < 0 < r? < ν2. (52)
Since the system features one state variable, K, and one jump variable, p, the equilibrium
yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.
Formal Solutions
General solutions paths are given by :
K(t)− K˜ = B1eν1t +B2eν2t, (53a)
p(t)− p˜ = ω12B1eν1t + ω22B2eν2t, (53b)
32Starting from the equality of labor marginal products between sectors, using the fact that fk = phk and
hk = r
? + δK , it is straightforward to prove that b11 is positive in the case k
N > kT .
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where we normalized ωi1 to unity. The eigenvector ω
i
2 associated with eigenvalue µi is given by
ωi2 =
νi − b11
b12
, (54)
with
b11 =
Y NK
µ
− δK = h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK ≷ 0, (55a)
b12 =
Y Np
µ
− cNp > 0, (55b)
where cNp is given by (30e).
Case kN > kT
This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio of the non traded good sector
exceeds the capital-labor of the traded sector. From (51), the stable and unstable eigenvalues
can be rewritten as follows:
ν1 = − f˜
p˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) < 0, (56a)
ν2 =
h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK > 0, (56b)
since we suppose that kN > kT .
We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:
Y NK = µ (ν2 + δK) > 0, (57a)
Y TK = p˜ν1 < 0, (57b)
p˜hkkk
N
p
µ
= −ν1 > 0, (57c)
Y NτF = k˜
T (ν2 + δK)σLL˜
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
> 0, (57d)
Y TτF = p˜k˜
Nν1σLL˜
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
< 0, (57e)
Y Nλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜k˜
Tµ (ν2 + δK) < 0, (57f)
Y Tλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜p˜k˜
Nν1 > 0. (57g)
We write out eigenvector ωi, corresponding with stable eigenvalue ν1 with i = 1, 2, to
determine their signs:
ω1 =
 1 (+)ν1−ν2(
Y Np
µ
−cNp
) (−)
 , ω2 =
 1 (+)
0
 . (58)
Case kT > kN
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This assumption reflects the fact that the capital-labor ratio of the traded good sector
exceeds the capital-labor ratio of the non traded sector. From (51), the stable and unstable
eigenvalues can be rewritten as follows:
ν1 =
h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
) − δK < 0, (59a)
ν2 = − f˜
p˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) > 0, (59b)
since we suppose that kT > kN .
We can deduce the signs of several useful expressions:
Y NK = µ (ν1 + δK) < 0, (60a)
Y TK = p˜ν2 > 0, (60b)
p˜hkkk
N
p
µ
= −ν2 < 0, (60c)
Y NτF = k˜
Tµ (ν1 + δK)σLL˜
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
< 0, (60d)
Y TτF = p˜k˜
Nν2σLL˜
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
> 0, (60e)
Y Nλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜k˜
Tµ (ν1 + δK) > 0, (60f)
Y Tλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
σLL˜p˜k˜
Nν2 < 0. (60g)
We write out the four eigenvectors ωi, corresponding with stable eigenvalues νi with i = 1, 2,
to determine their signs:
ω1 =
 1 (+)
0
 , ω2 =
 0ν2−ν1(
Y Np
µ
−cNp
) (+)
 . (61)
Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets
We first linearize equation (11) around the steady-state:
b˙(t) = r?
(
b(t)− b˜
)
+ Y TK
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+
[
Y Tp − cTp
]
(p(t)− p˜) . (62)
where cTp is given by (30b).
Inserting general solutions for K(t) and p(t), the solution for the stock of international
assets writes as follows:
b˙(t) = r?
(
b(t)− b˜
)
+ Y TK
2∑
i=1
Bie
νit +
[
Y Tp − cTp
] 2∑
i=1
Biω
i
2e
νit. (63)
Solving the differential equation leads to the following expression:
b(t)− b˜ =
[(
b0 − b˜
)
− Φ1B1 − Φ2B2
]
er
?t +Φ1B1eν1t +Φ2B2eν2t, (64)
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with
Φi =
Ni
νi − r? =
Y TK +
[
Y Tp − cTp
]
ωi2
νi − r? , i = 1, 2. (65)
Invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal solvency, the terms in brackets of
equation (64) must be null and we must set B2 = 0. We obtain the linearized version of the
nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:
b0 − b˜ = Φ1
(
K0 − K˜
)
. (66)
The stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:
b(t)− b˜ = Φ1
(
K(t)− K˜
)
. (67)
Case kN > kT
N1 = Y TK +
(
Y Tp − cTp
)
ω12,
= p˜ν2
{
1 +
ω12
p˜ν2
[
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK) Λ˜
]}
≷ 0, (68a)
N2 = Y TK +
(
Y Tp − cTp
)
ω22, (68b)
= Y TK = p˜ν1 < 0, (68c)
where (68c) follows from the fact that ω22 = 0. We made use of property (40a) together with the
fact that cTp = pccp−pcNp to compute Y Tp −cTp = −p˜
(
Y Np
µ − cNp
)
−pccp−σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK) Λ˜ ≷ 0.
The sign of Φ1 is ambiguous and reflects the impact of the capital accumulation on the net
foreign assets accumulation along a stable transitional path:
b˙(t) = Φ1K˙(t).
where K˙(t) = ν1B1eν1t. Following empirical evidence suggesting that the current account
and investment are negatively correlated (see e. g. Glick and Rogoff [1995]), we will impose
thereafter:
Assumption 1 Φ1 < 0 which implies that N1 > 0.
The condition for the assumption to hold, i. e. N1 > 0, may be rewritten as follows:
ν2 > −ω
1
2
p˜
[
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν2 + δK) Λ˜
]
. (69)
Case kT > kN
N1 = Y TK +
(
Y Tp − cTp
)
ω12,
= Y TK = p˜ν2 > 0, (70a)
N2 = Y TK +
(
Y Tp − cTp
)
ω22,
= p˜ν1
{
1 +
ω22
p˜ν1
[
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δk) Λ˜
]}
,≶ 0, (70b)
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where (70a) follows from the fact that ω12 = 0. We made use of property (40a) together with
cTp = pccp − pcNp to compute Y Tp − cTp = −p˜
(
Y Np
µ − cNp
)
− pccp − σLL˜k˜T (ν1 + δK) ≷ 0.
C Derivation of the Current Account Equation
This section is dedicated to the determination of current account law of motion. Substituting
the definition of transfer Z by using (8), substituting the market clearing condition for non
traded goods (9) into (3) we get:
b˙ = r?b(t) + rKK(t) + wAL(t)− pc (1 + τ c) c(t)− p(t)I(t) + Z,
= r?b+
(
rKK + wFL
)− pcc− p(Y N
µ
− cN − gN
)
.
Using the fact that LT + LN = L, KT +KN = K, , the dynamic equation for the current
account can be rewritten as follows:
b˙ = r?b+
[
wFLT +
(
rK
)
KT
]
+
[
wFLN +
(
rK + δK
)
KN
]− pY N
µ
− cT − gT ,
= r?b+ Y T − cT − gT ,
where the overall variable cost wFLN +rKKN in the non traded sector and output net of fixed
cost in that sector, i. e. pY
N
µ = pZ
N , cancel each other.33
D Savings
Formal Solution for Financial Wealth
The law of motion for financial wealth (S(t) = a˙(t)) is given by:
a˙(t) = r?a(t) +
[
w
(
p, τF , η
) (
1− τH)+ τHκ]L (λ¯, p, τF , τH)− pc (p) (1 + τ c) c (λ¯, p, τ c)+ Z,
(71)
with Z = τ cpcc+
[(
τH + τF
)
w − τHκ]L− gT − p˜gN .
The linearized version of (71) writes as follows:
a˙(t) = r? (a(t)− a˜) +M1 (p(t)− p˜) , (72)
with M1 given by
M1 =
(
wpL˜+ w˜Lp
) (
1 + τF
)− (c˜N + pccp + gN) ,
=
(
1 + τF
)
L˜wp
(
1 + Λ˜σL
)
− [c˜N (1− σc) + gN] ,
= −
{
K˜ (µ2 + δK) +
[
σLL˜Λ˜k˜T (µ2 + δK)− σcc˜N
]}
< 0. (73)
33In the traded sector which is perfectly competitive, we have : Y T = FLL
T + rKKT = wFLT + rKKT .
Instead, in the non traded sector which is imperfectly competitive we have: pZN = pHL
µ
LN + pHK
µ
KN or
pµZN = pY N = pHLL
N + pHKK
N = wFLN + rKKN .
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¿From the second line of (73), if σc < 1 as empirical studies suggest, then the term in square
brackets is positive andM1 is negative. The last line has been computed by using the fact that
L˜ = L˜N + L˜T and K˜ = k˜T L˜T + k˜N L˜N which allows to simplify 1µ
[
Y˜ N + L˜k˜T (µ2 + δK)µ
]
to
K˜ (µ2 + δK).
The general solution for the stock of financial wealth writes as follows:
a(t) = a˜+
[
(a0 − a˜)− M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?B1
]
er
?t +
M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?B1e
µ1t, (74)
where we used the fact that ω22 = 0.
Invoking the transversality condition, we obtain the stable solution for financial wealth:
a(t) = a˜+
M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?B1e
µ1t, (75)
and the intertemporal solvency condition
a˜− a0 = M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?
(
K˜ −K0
)
. (76)
Steady-State and Dynamic Effects of Tax Shocks
Differentiating (76) w. r. t. τ j (j = F,H), long-term changes of financial wealth are given
by:
da˜
dτ j
=
ω12
µ2
(
K˜µ2 + σLL˜k˜Tµ2 − σcc˜N
) dK˜
dτ j
. (77)
Differentiating (75) w. r. t. τ c and τ j (j = F,H), we get the dynamics of savings:
S(t) = a˙(t) = µ1
M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?
B1
dτ c
dτ ceµ1t > 0, (78a)
S(t) = a˙(t) = µ1
M1ω
1
2
µ1 − r?
B1
dτ j
dτ jeµ1t < 0, j = F,H, (78b)
where B1dτc = −
dK˜
dτc < 0 and
B1
dτ j = −
dK˜
dτ j > 0 as we shall see now in the next section.
E Long-Run Effects of Labor and Consumption Tax Changes
In this section, we calculate formal expressions of steady-state changes. For clarity purpose, we
assume that δK = 0 since it does not modify qualitatively the long-run effects of tax policies.
This assumption will be relaxed in numerical analysis. We totally differentiate the steady-state
which yields in a matrix form:
hkkk
N
p
µ 0 0 0(
Y Np
µ − cNp
)
Y NK
µ
(
Y N
λ¯
µ − cNλ¯
)
0(
Y Tp − cTp
)
Y TK
(
Y T
λ¯
− cT
λ¯
)
r?
0 −Φ1 0 1


dp˜
dK˜
dλ¯
db˜
 =

0
−Y
N
τF
µ dτ
F − Y
N
τH
µ dτ
H + cNτcdτ
c
−Y T
τF
dτF − Y T
τH
dτH + cTτcdτ
c
0

(79)
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The determinant denoted by D of the matrix of coefficients is given by:
D ≡ hkkk
N
p
µ
{
Y NK
µ
(
Y Tλ¯ − cTλ¯
)−(Y Nλ¯
µ
− cNλ¯
)[
Y TK + r
?Φ1
]}
(80)
We have to consider two cases, depending on wether the non traded sector is more or less
capital intensive than the traded sector:
D = −ν1ν2
p˜λ¯
(
σLw˜
F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)
> 0, case kT > kN , (81a)
D = −ν1ν2
p˜λ¯
{(
σLw˜
F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)
+
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2Λ˜
)}
> 0,(81b)
case kN > kT ,
where we used the fact that and µfkN − phkT = µwF (kN − kT ) together with
−p (kNν2 + kT ν1) ≡ wF if kT > kN or −p (kNν1 + kT ν2) ≡ wF if kN > kT .
Useful Expressions
We have computed these useful expressions:
Y NK
µ
Y Tλ¯ − Y TK
Y N
λ¯
µ
= σL
L˜
λ¯
h˜f˜(
k˜N − k˜T
) , (82a)
p′cY
T
K − (1− αc) pc
Y NK
µ
= −pc
p˜
αcf˜ + (1− αc) p˜h˜(
k˜N − k˜T
)
 , (82b)
Y N
λ¯
µ
− cNλ¯ =
1
λ¯
−σLL˜k˜T h˜(
k˜N − k˜T
) + σcc˜N
 , (82c)
Y TK − cTλ¯ =
p˜
λ¯
σLL˜k˜N f˜
p˜
(
k˜N − k˜T
) + σc c˜T
p˜
 . (82d)
In the case kN > kT , useful expressions (89) write as follows:
Y NK
µ
Y Tλ¯ − Y TK
Y N
λ¯
µ
= −p˜ν1ν2σLL˜
λ¯
(
k˜N − k˜T
)
> 0, (83a)
p′cY
T
K − (1− αc) pc
Y NK
µ
= −pc [ν2 − αcr?] < 0, (83b)
Y N
λ¯
µ
− cNλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
[
σLL˜k˜
T ν2 − σcc˜N
]
< 0, (83c)
Y Tλ¯ − cTλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
[
σLL˜p˜k˜
Nν1 − σcc˜T
]
> 0, (83d)
Y NK
µ
cTτc − Y TK cNτc =
σcpcc˜
(1 + τ c)
[−ν2 (1− αc) + ν1αc] < 0, (83e)
Y TK
Y N
τF
µ
− Y
N
K
µ
Y TτF = −p˜ν1ν2σLL˜
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
(
k˜N − k˜T
)
> 0, (83f)
Y TK
Y N
τH
µ
− Y
N
K
µ
Y TτH = −p˜ν1ν2σLL˜
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
(
k˜N − k˜T
)
> 0, (83g)
Y Tp − cTp =
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜Λ˜k˜T ν2
)
− p˜
(
Y Np
µ
− cNp
)
. (83h)
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where we used the fact that Y Tp = −p˜Y
N
p
µ − σLL˜Λ˜k˜T ν2, cTp = pccp − p˜cNp and pccp = −σcc˜N to
rewrite Y Tp − cTp (see (83h)).
In the case kT > kN , useful expressions (89) write as follows:
Y NK
µ
Y Tλ¯ − Y TK
Y N
λ¯
µ
= p˜ν1ν2
σLL˜
λ¯
(
k˜T − k˜N
)
< 0, (84a)
p′cY
T
K − (1− αc) pcY NK = −pc [ν1 − αcr?] > 0, (84b)
Y N
λ¯
µ
− cNλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
(
σLL˜k˜
T ν1 − σcc˜N
)
> 0, (84c)
Y Tλ¯ − cTλ¯ = −
1
λ¯
[
σLL˜p˜k˜
Nν2 − σcc˜T
]
≷ 0, (84d)
Y NK
µ
cTτc − Y TK cNτc =
σcpcc˜
(1 + τ c)
[−ν1 (1− αc) + ν2αc] > 0, (84e)
Y TK
Y N
τF
µ
− Y
N
K
µ
Y TτF = p˜ν1ν2σLL˜
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
(
k˜T − k˜N
)
< 0, (84f)
Y Tp − cTp =
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜Λ˜k˜T ν1
)
− p˜
(
Y Np
µ
− cNp
)
, (84g)
Y TK + r
?Φ1 = −p˜ν1. (84h)
Long-Run Effects of an Unanticipated Permanent Change in the Consumption
Tax Rate
case kN > kT
dc˜
dτ c
= −
(
σcc˜σLL˜
∆(1 + τ c)
)[
wF − k˜T r
?
ν2
ω12
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
≶ 0, (85a)
dL˜
dτ c
= −
(
σcpcc˜σLL˜
1 + τ c
)
1
∆
[
1 + αc
r?
ν2
ω12
p˜ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
< 0, (85b)
dλ¯
dτ c
= −
(
σcλ¯pcc˜
1 + τ c
)
1
∆
[
1 + αc
r?
ν2
ω12
p˜ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
< 0, (85c)
dp˜
dτ c
= 0, (85d)
dK˜
dτ c
=
1
ν2
(
1
1 + τ c
)(
σcpcc˜σLL˜
∆
)[
αck˜
Nν1 − (1− αc) k˜T ν2
]
< 0, (85e)
db˜
dτ c
= Φ1
dK˜
dτ c
> 0, (85f)
where ∆ =
[(
σLw˜
F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)
+ r
?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2Λ˜
)]
is assumed
to be positive.
case kT > kN
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dc˜
dτ c
= −
(
1
1 + τ c
)(
σcc˜σLw˜
F L˜
σLw˜F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)
< 0, (86a)
dL˜
dτ c
= −
(
1
1 + τ c
)(
σcpcc˜σLL˜
σLw˜F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)
< 0, (86b)
dλ¯
dτ c
= −λ¯
(
1
1 + τ c
)(
σcpcc˜
σLw˜F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)
< 0, (86c)
dp˜
dτ c
= 0, (86d)
dK˜
dτ c
=
1
ν1
(
1
1 + τ c
)(
σcpcc˜σLL˜
σLw˜F L˜+ σcpcc˜
)(
αck˜
Nν2 − (1− αc) k˜T ν1
)
< 0, (86e)
db˜
dτ c
= −p˜dK˜
dτ c
> 0. (86f)
Long-Run Effects of an Unanticipated Permanent Change in the Payroll Tax
Rate
case kN > kT
dc˜
dτF
= −σcc˜σLL˜∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
[
w˜F − k˜T r?ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
≶ 0, (87a)
dL˜
dτF
= −σLL˜
∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
{
σcpcc˜+
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)
σcc˜
N
}
< 0, (87b)
dλ¯
dτF
= λ¯
σLL˜
∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
[
w˜F − k˜T r?ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
≶ 0, (87c)
dp˜
dτF
= 0, (87d)
dK˜
dτF
=
σLL˜
∆ν2
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
σcpcc˜
[
αck˜
Nν1 − (1− αc) k˜T ν2
]
< 0, (87e)
db˜
dτF
= Φ1
dK˜
dτF
> 0, (87f)
where we used the fact that p˜
(
ν2k˜
T + ν1k˜N
)
= −p˜
(
h˜− hkk˜N
)
≡ −w˜F and LτH =
LτF
(w˜−κ)
w˜A
1+τF
Λ˜
.
case kT > kN
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dc˜
dτF
= −σcc˜σLL˜∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
w˜F =
1 + τ c
1 + τF
dc˜
dτ c
< 0, (88a)
dL˜
dτF
= −σLL˜
∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
σcpcc˜ =
1 + τ c
1 + τF
dL˜
dτ c
< 0, (88b)
dλ¯
dτF
= λ¯
σLL˜
∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
w˜F > 0, (88c)
dp˜
dτF
= 0, (88d)
dK˜
dτF
=
σLL˜
ν1∆
Λ˜
(1 + τF )
σcpcc˜
[
αck˜
Nν2 − (1− αc) k˜T ν1
]
< 0, (88e)
db˜
dτF
= −p˜ dK˜
dτF
> 0, (88f)
where we let ∆ ≡ σLw˜F L˜ + σcpcc˜ and we used the fact that −p˜
(
ν1k˜
T + ν2k˜N
)
=
p˜
(
h˜− hkk˜N
)
≡ w˜F .
Long-Run Effects of an Unanticipated Permanent Change in the Wage Income
Tax Rate
case kN > kT
dc˜
dτH
= −σcc˜σLL˜∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
[
w˜F − k˜T r?ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
≶ 0, (89a)
dL˜
dτH
= −σLL˜
∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
{
σcpcc˜+
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)
σcc˜
N
}
< 0, (89b)
dλ¯
dτH
= λ¯
σLL˜
∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
[
w˜F − k˜T r?ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)]
≶ 0, (89c)
dp˜
dτH
= 0, (89d)
dK˜
dτH
=
σLL˜
ν2∆
σcpcc˜
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
)
[
αck˜
Nν1 − (1− αc) k˜T ν2
]
< 0, (89e)
db˜
dτH
= −Φ1 dK˜dτH > 0, (89f)
where we used the fact that
w˜(1−τH)
w˜A
= Λ˜.
case kT > kN
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dc˜
dτH
= −σcc˜σLL˜∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
w˜F =
dc˜
dτF
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
1 + τF
Λ˜
< 0, (90a)
dL˜
dτH
= −σLL˜
∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
σcpcc˜ < 0, (90b)
dλ¯
dτH
= λ¯
σLL˜
∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
w˜F > 0, (90c)
dp˜
dτH
= 0, (90d)
dK˜
dτH
=
σLL˜
ν1∆
(w˜ − κ)
w˜A
σcpcc˜
[
αck˜
Nν2 − (1− αc) k˜T ν1
]
< 0, (90e)
db˜
dτH
= −p˜ dK˜
dτH
> 0, (90f)
where we let ∆ = σLw˜F L˜+ σcpcc˜.
Inelastic Labor Supply Case: σL = 0
If labor is supplied inelastically, then the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for labor
is null and total employment remains fixed to the level L¯ = 1.
Long-Run Effects of an Unanticipated Permanent Change of the Consumption
Tax Rate
Set σL = 0 into (85) or (86), we get:
dc˜
dτ c
=
dL˜
dτ c
=
dp˜
dτ c
=
dK˜
dτ c
=
db˜
dτ c
= 0, (91a)
dλ¯
dτ c
= − λ¯
(1 + τ c)
. (91b)
¿From (91a)-(91b), the elasticity of the marginal utility of wealth is equal to unity in abso-
lute terms and the long-run levels of variables remain unaffected. A rise in consumption tax
raises the marginal cost of current consumption. Since the trade-off between labor and leisure
turns out to be irrelevant, total employment remains fixed such that λ¯ must fall by the same
proportion than the rise in τ c thus leaving unaffected real consumption as the direct effect
and the wealth effect cancel each other. Since demand for non tradables and tradables remain
unaffected, capital stock and net foreign assets must not change for investment and the current
account to be zero in the long-run. As the capital stock remains unchanged in the long-run,
dynamics degenerate.
Long-Run Effects of an Unanticipated Permanent Change of the Payroll Tax
Rate
Set σL = 0 into (87) or (88), we get:
dc˜
dτF
=
dL˜
dτF
=
dλ¯
dτF
=
dp˜
dτF
=
dK˜
dτF
=
db˜
dτF
= 0, (92a)
dw˜
dτF
= − w˜
(1 + τF )
< 0. (92b)
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¿From (92a)-(92b), a fall in τF leaves unchanged the steady-state levels of variables, and more
importantly does no longer induce a wealth effect. The explanation is that whenever the trade-
off between labor and leisure turns out to be irrelevant, total employment remains fixed. To
insure that equality of sectoral labor marginal products holds, the wage must rise by the same
proportion than the fall in the payroll tax. As the capital stock remains unchanged in the
long-run, dynamics degenerate. In words, if labor is fixed, a change in the tax on wage paid
by producers induces solely a direct effect on the wage rate.
F The Two-Step Procedure: Wealth Effect and Tax Effects
By analytical convenience, we rewrite the system of steady-state equations, assuming that
δK = 0:
hk
[
kN (p˜)
]
µ
= r?, (93a)
1
µ
Y N
(
K˜, p˜, λ¯, τF , τH
)
− cN (λ¯, p˜, τ c)− gN = 0, (93b)
r?b˜+ Y T
(
K˜, p˜, λ¯, τF , τH
)
− cT (λ¯, p˜, τ c)− gT = 0, (93c)
together with the intertemporal solvency condition(
b˜− b0
)
= Φ1
(
K˜ −K0
)
. (93d)
whereK0 and b0 correspond to the initially predetermined stocks of physical capital and foreign
assets, the open economy starting from an initial steady-state at time T . If the fiscal shock is
permanent, then T = 0.
Derivation of Steady-State Functions
In a first step, we solve the system (93a)-(93c) for p˜, K˜ and b˜ as functions of the marginal
utility of wealth, λ¯, the tax rates on consumption and labor together with the mark-up. Totally
differentiating equations (93a)-(93c) yields in matrix form:
hkkk
N
p 0 0(
Y Np
µ − cNp
)
Y NK
µ 0(
Y Tp − cTp
)
Y TK r
?


dp˜
dK˜
db˜

=

Y NK
µ dµ
−
(
Y N
λ¯
µ − cNλ¯
)
dλ¯+ cNτcdτ
c − Y
N
τF
µ dτ
F − Y
N
τH
µ dτ
H −
(
Y Nµ
µ − Y
N
µ2
)
dµ
− (Y T
λ¯
− cT
λ¯
)
dλ¯+ cTτcdτ
c − Y T
τF
dτF − Y T
τH
dτH − Y Tµ dµ
 , (94)
where we used the fact that µf = p
[
h− hk
(
kN − kT )] and hkµ = r? at the steady-state to
rewrite r? − hkkkNµ as h˜µ(k˜N−k˜T ) =
Y NK
µ .
The equilibrium value of the marginal utility of wealth λ¯ and tax rates, τ c, τF , τH and τK
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determine the following steady-state values:
p˜ = p
(
τK , µ
)
, (95a)
K˜ = K
(
λ¯, τ c, τF , τH , µ
)
, (95b)
b˜ = v
(
λ¯, τ c, τF , τH , µ
)
, (95c)
with partial derivatives given by:
Kλ¯ ≡
∂K˜
∂λ¯
= − 1
λ¯
1
µ1
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜Tµ1
)
> 0 case kT > kN , (96a)
= − 1
λ¯
1
µ2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜Tµ2
)
> 0 case kN > kT , (96b)
vλ¯ ≡
∂b˜
∂λ¯
= − 1
λ¯
1
r?h˜
[
σc
(
f˜ c˜N + h˜c˜T
)
+ σLL˜h˜f˜
]
< 0, (96c)
and
Kτc ≡ ∂K˜
∂τ c
= − 1
µ1
(
σcc˜
N
1 + τ c
)
> 0 case kT > kN , (97a)
= − 1
µ2
(
σcc˜
N
1 + τ c
)
< 0 case kN > kT , (97b)
vτc ≡ ∂b˜
∂τ c
= − 1
r?h˜
(
σc
1 + τ c
)(
f˜ c˜N + h˜c˜T
)
< 0, (97c)
and
KτF ≡
∂K˜
∂τF
= − σLL˜
1 + τF
k˜T < 0, (98a)
vτF ≡
∂b˜
∂τF
=
f˜
r?
σLL˜
1 + τF
> 0, (98b)
and
KτH ≡
∂K˜
∂τH
= − σLL˜
1− τH k˜
T < 0, (99a)
vτH ≡
∂b˜
∂τH
=
f˜
r?
σLL˜
1− τH > 0. (99b)
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and
pµ ≡ ∂p˜
∂µ
= − p˜
µ
p˜Y NK
µY TK
= − p˜µ1
µµ2
> 0, case kT > kN , (100a)
= − p˜µ2
µµ1
> 0, case kN > kT , (100b)
Kµ ≡ ∂K˜
∂µ
=
p˜
µµ1µ2
[
Y Np
µ
− µ1cNp
]
+
Y N
µ2µ1
≶ 0, case kT > kN , (100c)
=
p˜
µµ1µ2
[
Y Np
µ
− µ2cNp
]
+
Y N
µ2µ2
≶ 0, case kN > kT , (100d)
vµ ≡ ∂b˜
∂µ
= − p˜
µµ2
[
p˜
(
Y Np
µ
r?
µ1
− cNp
)
+
(
σLL˜Λ˜k˜Tµ1 − µ1
r?
σcc˜
N
)]
+
L˜N f˜
µr?
≷ 0,
case kT > kN (100e)
= − p˜
µµ1
[
p˜
(
Y Np
µ
r?
µ2
− cNp
)
+
(
σLL˜Λ˜k˜Tµ2 − µ2
r?
σcc˜
N
)]
+
L˜N f˜
µr?
≷ 0,
case kN > kT (100f)
where we used the fact that hkkkNp = −µp
Y TK
p to derive the first equality of (100a). In addition,
we made use of the following property Y Nµ = − pµY Np and Y Tµ = − pµY Tp to determine (100c)-
(100d) and (100e)-(100f). Finally, use has been made of property (40a) to rewrite Y Tp − cTp and
property (40b) to simplify µY TK + µY
N
K which is equal to p˜µr
? in the long-run.
Since the change in the markup modifies the long-run levels of real consumption and labor
supply through the steady-state change in the relative price of non tradables, it is convenient
to write their steady-state functions by substituting (95a) into their static solutions (27) that
hold in the long-run:
c = m
(
λ¯, τ c, µ
)
, L = n
(
λ¯, τF , τH , µ
)
, (101)
where partial derivatives are given by (28) evaluated at the steady-state (that’s why we sub-
stitute respectively the notations m and n for c and L) and
mµ ≡ ∂c˜
∂µ
= αcσcc˜
µ1
µ2
< 0, case kT > kN , (102a)
= αcσcc˜
µ2
µ1
< 0, case kN > kT , (102b)
nµ ≡ ∂L˜
∂µ
= −σLL˜Λ˜k˜
T
w˜F
p˜h˜
f˜
p˜r?
µ2
< 0, (102c)
where partial derivatives w. r. t. to λ¯, τ c, τF , and τH are given by (28); we computed (102c)
as follows: nµ = σLL˜Λ˜k˜
T
w˜F
p˜Y NK
µY TK
p˜r?
µ .
Following the same procedure, i. e. substituting the steady-state function for the real
exchange rate into the static solution for wage evaluated at the steady-state, the steady-state
function for wage writes as follows:
w = w
(
τF , µ
)
, (103)
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where the partial derivative w. r. t. µ is given by:
wµ ≡ ∂w˜
∂µ
= − k˜
T
1 + τF
p˜h˜
f˜
p˜r?
µ2
< 0, (104)
where wµ = k˜
T
1+τF
p˜Y NK
µY TK
p˜r?
µ with
Y NK
Y TK
= − h˜
f˜
< 0.
Finally, following a similar procedure, we may express the rental rate of physical capital as
a function of τF and µ:
rK = rK
(
τK , µ
)
, (105)
where the partial derivative w. r. t. µ is given by:
rKµ ≡
∂r˜K
∂µ
= −r? p˜
µ
µ1
µ2
> 0, case kT > kN , (106)
rKµ ≡
∂r˜K
∂µ
= −r? p˜
µ
µ2
µ1
> 0, case kN > kT . (107)
and the partial derivative w. r. t. τF given by (34b).
Derivation of the Equilibrium Value of the Marginal Utility of Wealth
The second step consists to determine the equilibrium change of λ¯ by taking the total
differential of the intertemporal solvency condition (93d):
[vλ¯ − Φ1Kλ] dλ¯ = − [vτc − Φ1Kτc ] dτ c − [vτF − Φ1KτF ] dτF − [vτH − Φ1KτH ] dτH , (108)
from which may solve for the equilibrium value of λ¯ as a function of tax rates:
λ¯ = λ
(
τ c, τF , τH
)
, (109)
with
λτc ≡ ∂λ¯
∂τ c
= − [vτc − Φ1Kτc ]
[vλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
, (110a)
λτF ≡
∂λ¯
∂τF
= − [vτF − Φ1KτF ]
[vλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
, (110b)
λτH ≡
∂λ¯
∂τH
= − [vτH − Φ1KτH ]
[vλ¯ − Φ1Kλ¯]
. (110c)
G Long-Term Effects of a Labor Tax Reform
We first substitute short-run static solutions for consumption, wage and labor given by (27)
and (33), into the balanced government budget constraint (8) evaluated at the steady-state:
τ cpc (p˜) c
(
λ¯, p˜, τ c
)
+
[(
τF + τH
)
w
(
p˜, τF
)− τHκ]L (λ¯, p˜, τF , τH) = Z, (111)
keeping in mind that the long-run value of the real exchange rate is unaffected by fiscal tax
changes and λ¯ = λ
(
τ c, τF , τH
)
.
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G.1 Steady-State Changes of a Tax Reform: Substitution of Payroll Taxes
for Consumption Taxes
In this section, we estimate the long-run effects of a fall in the payroll tax τF associated with a
rise in the consumption tax rate τ c, which is adjusted accordingly to balance the government
budget. Additionally, we assume that taxes on labor income are progressive so that κ > 0
and Λ < 1. To avoid confusion, we denote by
∣∣j,c the effects of the tax reform which involves
simultaneously cutting the tax j = F and increasing the tax k = c so that as to leave balanced
the government budget condition. In brief, the tax reform strategy involves simultaneously
cutting the payroll tax by dτF < 0 and increasing the tax on consumption goods dτ c|F,c > 0.
Holding τH constant, we differentiate (111)
pcc˜dτ c
∣∣F,c + τ cpcdc˜∣∣F,c + [(τF + τH)wτF + w˜]dτF + (w˜F − w˜A) dL˜∣∣F,c = 0, (112)
with
[(
τF + τH
)
wτF + w˜
]
= w˜
(
1−τH
1+τF
)
> 0.
By using the fact that dx˜
∣∣F,c = dx˜dτF dτF + dx˜dτcdτ c∣∣F,c, and by rearranging terms, we can
determine the size of the rise in the consumption tax rate τ c
∣∣F,c after a fall in the payroll tax
τF such that the governement budget constraint (111) remains balanced:
dτ c
∣∣F,c = −χF
χc
dτH = −
τ
cpc
dc˜
dτF +
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜dτF + (1−τH1+τF ) w˜L˜
τ cpc
dc˜
dτc + (w˜
F − w˜A) dL˜dτc + pcc˜
dτF , (113)
where the signs of χF and χc will be estimated later.
case kN > kT
If the non traded sector is relatively more capital intensive than the traded sector, the
long-run changes are given by:
dλ¯
∣∣F,c = λτF dτF + λτcdτ c∣∣F,c,
=
λ¯
χc
pcc˜
∆
{
χF
1 + τ c
σc
(
1 +
σLw˜
F L˜
σcpcc˜
)
+ σLw˜F L˜
Λ˜
1 + τF
(
1− w˜
AL˜
pc (1 + τ c) c˜
)}
dτF
+
λ¯
χc∆
ω12
ν2
r?
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)[ χF
1 + τ c
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2
)
− σLL˜kT ν2 Λ˜1 + τF pcc˜
(
1− w˜
AL˜
pc (1 + τ c) c˜
)]
dτF < 0, (114a)
dx˜
∣∣F,c = ∂x˜
∂τF
dτF +
∂x˜
∂τ c
dτ c
∣∣F,c
=
∂x˜
∂τF
pcc˜
χc
[
1− w˜
AL˜
pcc˜ (1 + τ c)
]
dτF > 0, (114b)
where x = c,K,L, b. To determine (114b), we used the fact that ∂x˜∂τc =
∂x˜
∂τF
1+τF
1+τc
1
Λ˜
and
substituted (113), by remembering that χc = 1+τ
F
1+τc
1
Λ˜
[
χF − Λ˜1+τF w˜AL˜
]
+ pcc˜.
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We estimated χc and χF in the case kN > kT as follows:
χc = τ cpc
dc˜
dτ c
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτ c
+ pcc˜
=
w˜F L˜pcc˜
(1 + τ c)∆
{
σc (1 + τ c)
(
pcc˜
w˜F L˜
− σL τ
c
1 + τ c
)
+ σL
[
(1 + τ c)− σcτA
]}
− (1 + τ c) ω
1
2
ν2
r?
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)
{
σLL˜k
T ν2Λ˜
(
1 + σL
τ c
1 + τ c
)
− σcc˜N
(
1 + σL
w˜F L˜
pc (1 + τ c) c˜
τA
)}
> 0, (115a)
χF = τ cpc
dc˜
dτF
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτF
+
(
Λ˜
1 + τF
)
w˜AL˜. (115b)
While the sign of χc is positive, we are unable to determine the sign of χF . However, since it
is reasonable to suppose that a rise in the consumption tax rate is required after a fall in the
payroll tax rate for the government budget to be balanced, we assume that χF > 0.
case kT > kN
If the traded sector is relatively more capital intensive than the non traded sector, the
long-run changes are given by:
dλ¯
∣∣F,c = λτF dτF + λτcdτ c∣∣F,c,
=
λτF
χc
{
1 + τF
1 + τ c
χF
Λ˜
(
1 +
σcpcc˜
σLw˜F L˜
)
+ pcc˜
(
1− w˜
AL˜
pcc˜ (1 + τ c)
)}
dτF < 0, (116a)
dc˜
∣∣F,c = ∂x˜
∂τF
dτF +
∂x˜
∂τ c
dτ cλτcdτ c
∣∣F,c
=
∂x˜
∂τF
pcc˜
χc
[
1− w˜
AL˜
pcc˜ (1 + τ c)
]
dτF > 0, (116b)
where x = c,K,L, b. To derive (116a), we made use of the fact that λτc = −λτF σcpcc˜σLw˜F L˜
1
Λ˜
1+τF
1+τc .
To determine (116b), we used the fact that ∂x˜∂τc =
∂x˜
∂τF
1+τF
1+τc
1
Λ˜
and substituted (113), by remem-
bering that χc = 1+τ
F
1+τc
1
Λ˜
[
χF − Λ˜1+τF w˜AL˜
]
+ pcc˜. It is interesting to notice that the fall in the
marginal utility of wealth following a rise in τ c is strengthened by its decrease after a reduction
in τF .
We estimated χc and χF in the case kT > kN as follows:
χc = τ cpc
dc˜
dτ c
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτ c
+ pcc˜
=
w˜F L˜pcc˜
(1 + τ c)∆
{
σc (1 + τ c)
(
pcc˜
w˜F L˜
− σL τ
c
1 + τ c
)
+ σL
[
(1 + τ c)− σcτA
]}
> 0, (117a)
χF = τ cpc
dc˜
dτF
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτF
+
(
1− τH
1 + τF
)
w˜L˜ (117b)
=
w˜F L˜pcc˜
∆
Λ˜
1 + τF
{
σc
(
w˜A
w˜F
− σcτ c
)
+ σL
(
w˜AL˜
pcc˜
− σcτA
)}
≷ 0, (117c)
The term χc captures two conflictory effects induced by a rise in the consumption tax rate on
public revenue. For given levels of real consumption and employment, the increased consump-
tion tax rate raises fiscal earnings as it is reflected by the third term on the RHS of (117a) (first
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line). However, by increasing the consumption tax rate, households are induced to reduce both
their real consumption and their labor supply. Inspection of (117a) (second line) shows that
the first term in braces is positive since pcc˜
w˜F L˜
> 1 as longer as a˜ > 0 and because τ
c
1+τc is very
small (the average value of the consumption tax rate for 13 OECD countries is approximately
10%). The second term of (117a) (second line) is also positive since σc is lower than unity
according to empirical evidence and 0 < τA < 1. Consequently, according to (117a), χc > 0; in
brief, the decrease in the tax bases via lower consumption and employment is not large enough
to more than outweigh the positive tax rate effect.
The sign of χF is unclear. Inspection of (117c) shows that the signs of the two terms in
braces are ambiguous: [i] because w˜
A
w˜F
< 1 and σLτ c < 1, and since [ii] w˜
AL˜
pcc˜
< 1 and σcτA < 1.
However, we may reasonably expect that a fall in the payroll tax, i. e. dτF < 0, does not pay
for itself so that the rise in the tax bases via higher consumption and higher employment, is not
large enough to offset the negative public revenue effect originating from the cut of the labor
income tax rate dτF . Consequently, we may assume that χF > 0 so that the consumption tax
rate must rise for the government balanced budget to hold.
G.2 Steady-State Changes of a Tax Reform: Substitution of labor income
Taxes for Consumption Taxes
In this section, we estimate the long-run effects of a fall in the labor income tax τH associated
with a rise in the consumption tax rate τ c, which is adjusted accordingly to balance the
government budget. Additionally, we assume that taxes on labor income are progressive so
that κ > 0 and Λ < 1. To avoid confusion, we denote by
∣∣j,c the effects of the tax reform
which involves simultaneously cutting the tax j = H and increasing the tax k = c so that
as to to leave balanced the government budget condition. In brief, the tax reform strategy
involves simultaneously cutting the labor income tax by dτH < 0 and increasing the tax on
consumption goods dτ c|F,c > 0.
Differentiate (111) by letting τF constant, we can derive the size of the rise in the con-
sumption tax rate:
dτ c
∣∣H,c = −χH
χc
dτH = −
τ
cpc
dc˜
dτH +
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜dτH + (w˜ − κ) L˜
τ cpc
dc˜
dτc + (w˜
F − w˜A) dL˜dτc + pcc˜
dτH . (118)
Making use of long-term effects of permanent changes in τH and τ c and substituting dτ c
∣∣H,c
given by (118), we are able to estimate the directions and the sizes of the long-run changes of
main economic variables after a fall in τH associated with a rise in τ c by an amount that leaves
balanced the government budget constraint. As it is formally shown below, long-run changes
are not qualitatively sensitive to sectoral capital-labor ratios. Instead, their magnitude depends
on the steady-state variations after a fall in τF . Hence, the beneficial effects of a fiscal reform
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will be sensitive to sectoral capital intensities due to the feed-back effect or “secondary effect”
originating from the real exchange rate dynamics over the transition.
case kN > kT
If the non traded sector is relatively more capital intensive than the traded sector, the
long-run changes are given by:
dλ¯
∣∣H,c = λτHdτH + λτcdτ c∣∣H,c,
=
λ¯
χc
pcc˜
∆
{
χH
1 + τ c
σc
(
1 +
σLw˜
F L˜
σcpcc˜
)
+ σLw˜F L˜
(
w˜ − κ
w˜
)(
1− w˜
AL˜
pc (1 + τ c) c˜
)}
dτH
+
λ¯
χc∆
ω12
ν2
r?
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)[ χH
1 + τ c
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2
)
− σLL˜kT ν2
(
w˜ − κ
w˜
)
pcc˜
(
1− w˜
AL˜
pc (1 + τ c) c˜
)]
dτH > 0, (119a)
dx˜
∣∣H,c = ∂x˜
∂τH
dτH +
∂x˜
∂τ c
dτ c
∣∣H,c
=
∂x˜
∂τH
pcc˜
χc
[
1− w˜
AL˜
pcc˜ (1 + τ c)
]
dτH , (119b)
where x = c,K,L, b. To determine (119b), we used the fact that ∂x˜∂τc =
∂x˜
∂τH
1
1+τc
(
w˜A
w˜−κ
)
and
substituted (118), by remembering that χc = 11+τc
(
w˜A
w˜−κ
) [
χH − (w˜ − κ) L˜
]
+ pcc˜.
We estimated χc and χH in the case kN > kT as follows:
χc = τ cpc
dc˜
dτ c
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτ c
+ pcc˜
=
w˜F L˜pcc˜
(1 + τ c)∆
{
σc (1 + τ c)
(
pcc˜
w˜F L˜
− σL τ
c
1 + τ c
)
+ σL
[
(1 + τ c)− σcτA
]}
+ (1 + τ c)
ω12
ν2
r?
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)
{
− σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
(
1 + σL
τ c
1 + τ c
)
+ σcc˜N
(
1 + σL
w˜F L˜
pc (1 + τ c) c˜
τA
)}
> 0, (120a)
χH = τ cpc
dc˜
dτH
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτH
+ (w˜ − κ) L˜ > 0. (120b)
While the sign of χc is positive, we are unable to determine the sign of χH . However, since it
is reasonable to suppose that a rise in the consumption tax rate is required after a fall in the
labor income tax rate for the government budget to be balanced, we assume that χH > 0.
case kT > kN
If the traded sector is relatively more capital intensive than the non traded sector, the
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long-run changes are given by:
dλ¯
∣∣H,c = λτHdτH + λτcdτ c∣∣H,c,
=
λτH
χc
{
χH
1 + τ c
(
w˜A
w˜ − κ
)(
1 +
σcpcc˜
σLw˜F L˜
)
+ pcc˜
(
1− w˜
AL˜
pcc˜ (1 + τ c)
)}
dτH < 0,(121a)
dx˜
∣∣H,c = ∂x˜
∂τH
dτH +
∂x˜
∂τ c
dτ c
∣∣H,c
=
∂x˜
∂τH
pcc˜
χc
[
1− w˜
AL˜
pcc˜ (1 + τ c)
]
dτH , (121b)
where x = c,K,L, b. To derive (121a), we made use of the fact that λτc = −λτH σcpcc˜σLw˜F L˜
w˜A
(w˜−κ) .
To determine (121b), we used the fact that ∂x˜∂τc =
∂x˜
∂τH
1
1+τc
(
w˜A
w˜−κ
)
and substituted (118), by
remembering that χc = 11+τc
(
w˜A
w˜−κ
) [
χH − (w˜ − κ) L˜
]
+pcc˜. It is interesting to notice that the
fall in the marginal utility of wealth following a rise in τ c is strengthened by its decrease after
a reduction in τH .
We estimated χc and χH in the case kT > kN as follows:
χc = τ cpc
dc˜
dτ c
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτ c
+ pcc˜
=
w˜F L˜pcc˜
(1 + τ c)∆
{
σc (1 + τ c)
(
pcc˜
w˜F L˜
− σL τ
c
1 + τ c
)
+ σL
[
(1 + τ c)− σcτA
]}
> 0, (122a)
χH = τ cpc
dc˜
dτH
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτH
+ (w˜ − κ) L˜
=
w˜F L˜pcc˜
∆
(
w˜ − κ
w˜A
){
σc
(
w˜A
w˜F
− σLτ c
)
+ σL
(
w˜AL˜
pcc˜
− σcτA
)}
≷ 0, (122b)
The term χc captures two conflictory effects induced by a rise in the consumption tax rate on
public revenue. For given levels of real consumption and employment, the increased consump-
tion tax rate raises fiscal earnings as it is reflected by the third term on the RHS of (122a) (first
line). However, by increasing the consumption tax rate, households are induced to reduce both
their real consumption and their labor supply. Inspection of (122a) (second line) shows that
the first term in braces is positive since pcc˜
w˜F L˜
> 1 as longer as a˜ > 0 and because τ
c
1+τc is very
small (the average value of the consumption tax rate for 13 OECD countries is approximately
10%). The second term of (122a) (second line) is also positive since σc is lower than unity
according to empirical evidence and 0 < τA < 1. Consequently, according to (122a), χc > 0; in
brief, the decrease in the tax bases via lower consumption and employment is not large enough
to more than outweigh the positive tax rate effect.
The sign of χH is unclear. Inspection of (122b) shows that the signs of the two terms in
braces are ambiguous: [i] because w˜
A
w˜F
< 1 and σLτ c < 1, and since [ii] w˜
AL˜
pcc˜
< 1 and σcτA < 1.
However, we may reasonably expect that a fall in the labor income tax rate dτH < 0 does not
pay itself so that the rise in the tax bases via higher consumption and higher employment, is not
large enough to offset the negative public revenue effect originating from the cut of the labor
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income tax rate dτH . Consequently, we may assume that χH > 0 so that the consumption tax
rate must rise for the government balanced budget to hold.
H Dynamic Effects of a Tax Reform
This section estimates the dynamic effects of a tax restructuring. Steady-state changes are
those derived into the previous section where we estimated the long-run variations such that
the rise in τ c guarantees that the balanced condition for the government holds. In addition,
we consider that the change of the tax scheme can be viewed as an unanticipated permanent
tax shock, i. e. in the two first tax reforms we considered, the labor and the consumption tax
rates are changed simultaneously so as the government budget balanced condition is met and
in the third tax reform, the payroll and the labor income tax rates are changes simultaneously
so as to leave unchanged the marginal tax wedge.
The stable adjustment of the economy is described by a saddle-path in (K, p)-space. The
capital stock, the real exchange rate, and the stock of traded bonds evolve according to:
K(t) = K˜ +B1eν1t, (123a)
p(t) = p˜+ ω12B1e
ν1t, (123b)
b(t) = b˜+Φ1B1eν1t, (123c)
where ω12 = 0 if k
T > kN and with
B1 = K0 − K˜ = −dK˜
∣∣j,k,
where we made use of the constancy of K at time t = 0 (i. e. K0 is predetermined).
H.1 A Permanent Rise in the Consumption Tax Rate
case kN > kT
Using the fact that the steady-state value of the real exchange rate remains unaffected by
the change of the consumption tax rate, the initial reaction of the relative price of non tradables
is given by:
dp(0)
dτ c
= −ω12d
dK˜
dτ c
< 0, (124)
where ω12 < 0 and the long-run change of the capital stock is given by (85e).
Regarding the initial reaction of real consumption, evaluating first at time t = 0 and
differentiating the short-run static solution for real consumption (27) w. r. t. τ c leads to:
dc(0)
dτ c
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dτ c
+ cp
dp(0)
dτ c
+ cτc ,
= − σcc˜σLL˜
∆(1 + τ c)
{
w˜F
(
1 + αcσc
c˜N
p˜
ω12
ν2
)
− k˜T ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
Nν1 − r?σLL˜k˜T ν2
)}
≶ 0.
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Regarding the initial reaction of employment, evaluating first at time t = 0 and differenti-
ating the short-run static solution for labor supply (27) w. r. t. τ c leads to:
dL(0)
dτ c
= Lλ¯
dλ¯
dτ c
+ Lp
dp(0)
dτ c
≶ 0, (125)
with Lp = −σL L˜w˜ k˜
T
(1+τF )
ν2 < 0.
Differentiating solutions (123) with respect to time, we are able to compute the directions
of trajectories:
K˙(t) = I(t) = −ν1dK˜dτ c e
ν1tdτ c < 0, (126a)
p˙(t) = −ν1ω12
dK˜
dτ c
eν1tdτ c = ω12I(t) > 0, (126b)
b˙(t) = −ν1Φ1dK˜dτ c e
ν1tdτ c = Φ1I(t) > 0, (126c)
with Φ1 < 0 and dK˜dτc < 0.
case kT > kN
With the reversal of capital intensities, both real consumption and total employment fall
immediately to their new lower long-run levels. Over the transition, the negative investment
flow is exactly matched by a current account surplus, thus leaving unchanged savings.
H.2 A Permanent Fall in the Payroll Tax Rate
case kN > kT
Regarding the initial reaction of real consumption, evaluating first at time t = 0 and
differentiating the short-run static solution for real consumption (27) w. r. t. τF leads to:
dc(0)
dτF
= cλ¯
dλ¯
dτF
+ cp
dp(0)
dτF
,
= − σcc˜σLL˜
∆(1 + τF )
{
w˜F
(
1 + αcσc
c˜N
p˜
ω12
ν2
)
− k˜T ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
Nν1 − r?σLL˜k˜T ν2
)}
≶ 0.(127)
Regarding the initial reaction of employment, evaluating first at time t = 0 and differenti-
ating the short-run static solution for labor supply (27) w. r. t. τF leads to:
dL(0)
dτF
= Lλ¯
dλ¯
dτF
+ Lp
dp(0)
dτF
+ LτF ≶ 0. (128)
case kT > kN
With the reversal of capital intensities, both real consumption and total employment reach
immediately to their new higher long-run levels. Over the transition, the positive investment
flow is exactly matched by a current account deficit, thus leaving unchanged savings.
H.3 Dynamic Effects of a Tax Restructuring
First, it is convenient to introduce some notations. We index by the superscript j the impact
and steady-state effects induced by a fiscal reform strategy which involves simultaneous cutting
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the labor tax dτ j (i e. j = F if the payroll tax is reduced or j = H if the labor income tax
is lowered) and increasing the tax rate by dτk (k = c,H). While the two first tax reform
strategies involves a rise in the consumption tax rate by dτ c|j,c > 0 (so as to leave balanced the
government budget constraint), the third tax reform strategy involves an increase in the labor
income tax rate by dtauH |F,H > 0 (so as to leave unchanged the marginal tax wedge τM ).
This leads to long-run changes which can be written as follows:
dx˜
∣∣j,k = dx˜
dτ j
Φj,kdτ j , j = F,H, k = c,H, (129)
where x = c, L,K and we denoted by 0 < Φj,k < 1 the scaled-down term of the long-run change
after a fall in the labor tax (j = F,H). In addition, we denote by Υj the positive term:
ΥF =
Λ˜
1 + τF
> 0, ΥH = w˜ − κ > 0, (130)
with ΥF = 1
1+τF
and ΥH = 1 if κ = 0.
case kN > kT
Using the fact that the steady-state value of the real exchange rate remains unaffected by
a tax restructuring, the initial jump of p is formally given by:
dp(0)
∣∣j,k = −ω12dK˜∣∣j,k > 0, (131)
where the long-run change of the capital stock is given by (129) (set x = K). From the short-
run static solution for real consumption (27), the substitution of its long-run change (129) (set
x = c) together with the initial jump of the real exchange rate (131), the initial reaction of real
consumption is given by:
dc(0)
∣∣j,k = dc˜∣∣j,k + cpdp(0)∣∣j,k = [ dc˜dτ j − cpω12 dK˜dτ j
]
Φj,kdτ j ,
= −σcc˜σLL˜
∆
Υj
{
w˜F
(
1 + αcσc
c˜N
p˜
ω12
ν2
)
− r?k˜T ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
Nν1 − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)}
Φj,kdτ j ≷ 0, (132)
where we used the fact that cp = −σcαc c˜p˜ < 0, Υj > 0 (see (130)),
(
1 + αcσc c˜
N
p˜
ω12
ν2
)
> 0
(see (69) by setting σL = 0) and dτ j < 0 since we considered a fiscal reform strategy which
simultaneously involves cutting labor tax and raising the consumption tax rate so as to leave
balanced the government budget constraint; in addition, ∆ > 0.
By applying a similar procedure to labor, we can derive its reaction once the fiscal reform
is implemented, i. e. at time t = 0:
dL(0)
∣∣j,k = dL˜∣∣j,k + Lpdp(0)∣∣j,k = [ dL˜dτ j − Lpω12 dK˜dτ j
]
Φj,kdτ j ,
= −σLL˜
∆
Υj
{
σcpcc˜+
ω12
ν2
[
σLL˜Λ˜k˜T ν2σc
(
c˜N +
pcc˜
w˜F L˜
L˜k˜T ν2
)
+
r?
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2Λ˜
)
σcc˜
N
]}
Φj,kdτ j ≷ 0, (133)
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where ∆ > 0, dτ j < 0, and we used the fact that Lp = −σLL˜Λ˜k˜T ν2w˜F < 0, Υj > 0 (see (130)).
Differentiating solutions (123) with respect to time, we are able to compute the directions
of trajectories:
K˙(t) = I(t) = −ν1dK˜
∣∣j,keν1t > 0, (134a)
p˙(t) = −ν1ω12dK˜
∣∣j,keν1t = ω12I(t) < 0, (134b)
b˙(t) = −ν1Φ1dK˜
∣∣j,keν1t = Φ1I(t) < 0, (134c)
with Φ1 < 0 and dK˜
∣∣j,k > 0.
Regarding consumption and labor supply behavior, their trajectories can be computed
by linearizing their short-run static solutions in the neighborhood of the steady-state and
differentiating these with respect to time:
c˙(t) = cpp˙(t) > 0, L˙(t) = Lpp˙(t) > 0, (135)
with cp < 0 and Lp < 0. From impact and steady-state effects, their rising temporal profiles
imply that if they rise in the short-run, their initial upward jumps display a smaller size than
the size of their long-run changes.
case kT > kN
Since the real exchange rate remains unaffected by the fiscal shock in the short-run, real
consumption and labor jump immediately to their new higher steady-state levels.
Differentiating solutions (123) with respect to time, we are able to compute the directions
of trajectories:
K˙(t) = I(t) = −ν1dK˜
∣∣j,keν1t > 0, (136a)
p˙(t) = 0, (136b)
b˙(t) = −ν1Φ1dK˜
∣∣j,keν1t = Φ1I(t) < 0. (136c)
I Tax Wedge
In line with general practice, payroll taxes are assumed to be proportional and wage income
taxes are taken to be progressive. Following Heijdra and Lightart [2009], we define the average
tax wedge as the difference between the producer wage (paid by the firm) and the purchasing
power on consumption goods of after-tax average wage expressed as a percentage of the wage
including payroll taxes:
τA ≡ wL
(
1 + τF
)− [(1− τH)w + τHκ]L
wFL
,
≡ 1−
[(
1− τH)+ τHκw ]
(1 + τF )
(137)
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where wF = w
(
1 + τF
)
. In addition, we denote by τM the marginal tax wedge as the
difference between the producer wage (paid by the firm) and the after-tax marginal wage
expressed as a percentage of the producer cost (i. e. including payroll taxes):
τM ≡ wL
(
1 + τF
)− wL (1− τH)
wFL
,
≡ 1−
(
1− τH)
(1 + τF )
. (138)
The closer to unity τM , the larger the gap between the wage paid by firms and the real wage
received by households.
Using the definition of τM given by (138), we can rewrite the average tax wedge as follows:
τA ≡ τM − τ
Hκ
wF
. (139)
Finally, we provide a measure of the degree of tax progressiveness by the means of the coefficient
of average tax progression:
Γ
(
τF , τH , κ, p
) ≡ τM − τA = τHκ
wF
, (140)
where wF = w
(
1 + τF
)
with w = w
(
τF , p
)
.
As the average tax burden τA rises with wage rate, the system tax is progressive such that
Γ (.) > 0 which holds as longer as κ > 0. It is worth emphasizing that our approach which
consists to define the average tax together with the marginal tax wedge by taking into account
the wage paid by the firm allows for “scaling” the tax burden faced by households in terms of
firms’ labor cost, the index of average tax progression being expressed in terms of consumption
goods; that’s why we use the “wedge” label. By abstracting from this “scaling” approach, we
would define the marginal and average tax wedges together with the coefficient of average tax
progression as follows : τM ≡ τHw, τA ≡ τH (w − κ) and Γ ≡ τHκ > 0 (as longer as κ > 0).
J Labor Tax Reform: A Fall in Payroll Taxes and a Rise in
Labor Income Taxes
In this section, we consider a labor tax strategy which involves simultaneously cutting a payroll
tax by dτF < 0 and increasing the labor income tax by dτH > 0 so as to leave unchanged the
marginal tax wedge, i. e. dτM = 0. By making use of (138), the labor tax reform strategy
requires a rise in the wage income tax by the following amount:
dτH
∣∣F,H ≡ −θdτF , θ ≡ 1− τH
1 + τF
< 1. (141)
From (141), the income wage tax must be increased by a smaller amount than the fall in tauF
for leaving unchanged the marginal tax wedge. Because we assumed initial positive payroll
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taxes so that the denominator of (138) is higher than unity, the fiscal reform keeping the
marginal tax wedge constant does not yield to a change in τH by the same proportion than
the fall in τF .
Substituting the static solution for the wage rate (33) that holds in the long-run, and
differentiating the coefficient of average tax progression (140) w. r. t. τH and τF , and the
using (141), we find that the fiscal reform raises the degree of average tax progression :
dΓ = − κ
wF
θdτF > 0, (142)
where dτF < 0 since we considered a fall in payroll taxes. The explanation comes from the
fact that the wage rate is raised by the same proportion than the fall in τF . Consequently, as
longer as κ > 0, the rise in τH leads to an increase in Γ.
Making use of long-term effects of permanent changes in τF and τH and substituting
dτH
∣∣F,H given by (141), we are able to estimate the directions and the sizes of the long-run
changes of main economic variables after a fall in τF associated with a rise in τH by an amount
that leaves unaffected τM .
case kN > kT
If the non traded sector is relatively more capital intensive than the traded sector, the
long-run changes are given by:
dλ¯
∣∣F,H = λτHdτH ∣∣F,H + λτF dτF ,
=
dλ¯
dτF
κ
Λ˜
(
1− τH)
w˜A
dτF =
dλ¯
dτF
κ
w˜
dτF , (143a)
dx˜
∣∣F,H = ∂x˜
∂τH
dτH
∣∣F,H + ∂x˜
∂τF
dτF
=
∂x˜
∂τF
[
1− θ (w˜ − κ)
(
1 + τF
)
w˜ (1− τH)
]
dτF =
dx˜
dτF
κ
w˜
dτF , (143b)
(143c)
where x = c,K,L, b and we used the fact that ∂x˜
∂τH
=
(w˜−κ)(1+τF )
w˜(1−τH)
∂x˜
∂τF
. From (143b), the long-
run changes of real consumption, physical capital and employment fiscal tax reform following
a substitution of payroll taxes for income wage taxes are proportional to the steady-state
variations after a change in τF . While the directions of real expenditure in consumption goods
and labor supply are ambiguous, we have been able to state that overall capital stock must
rise after a fall in wage taxes paid by employers so that K˜ will be permanently increased
after the fiscal tax reform. Interestingly, the larger tax allowances κ, the stronger the long-run
stimulus of capital accumulation. This comes from the fact that a higher κ softens the fall in
the after-tax labor income and therefore the decrease in the marginal benefit of supplying labor
and consequently moderates the that impinges negatively on L˜. In addition, as κ gets larger,
the combined effect of a smaller drop of employment and a lower reduction of the after-tax
wage income w˜A moderates the wealth effect and therefore the decline in real expenditure in
consumption goods.
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It is now convenient to explore the overall effect of the fiscal tax reform on public revenue.
First, while the fall in the tax rate paid by employers reduces the government revenues, they
are raised by the increased income labor tax rate paid by households. Since the former is levied
on a relatively larger tax basis than the former, i. e. τH increased by a smaller amount than
the fall in τF , for given wage rate and employment, labor fiscal revenues decreased. Second,
the fiscal reform strategy makes households willing to spend a larger share of their available
time to work and to raise their consumption expenditure, public revenues from labor taxes and
VAT increase.
To estimate the overall effect of the fiscal reform strategy on public revenues, we differentiate
the balanced government budget constraint (111):
dZ = τ cpcdc˜
∣∣F,H + (w˜F − w˜A) dL˜∣∣F,H + {[w˜ + (τF + τH)wτF ]dτF + (w˜ − κ) dτH ∣∣F,H} L˜,
(144)
where the steady-changes in real consumption and labor supply lead to the following variation
in public revenues:
τ cpcdc˜
∣∣F,H + (w˜F − w˜A) dL˜∣∣F,H
= −σLL˜
∆
κΛ˜σc
{
pcc˜
[
(1 + τ c)− w˜
A
w˜F
]
+
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2
)(
c˜NτA − pcc˜
w˜F
τ ck˜T ν2
)}
< 0.(145)
The sign of (145) follows from the fact that consumption and employment rise after a fall in
the payroll tax τF so that government earnings grow. In addition, we computed the last term
on the RHS of (111) which can be rewritten as follows:
[
w˜ +
(
τF + τH
)
wτF
]
L˜dτF + (w˜ − κ) L˜dτH ∣∣F,H = κθL˜τF < 0. (146)
case kT > kN
If the traded sector is relatively more capital intensive than the non traded sector, the
long-run changes are given by:
dλ¯
∣∣F,H = λτHdτH ∣∣F,H + λτF dτF ,
=
dλ¯
dτF
κ
Λ˜
(
1− τH)
w˜A
dτF =
dλ¯
dτF
κ
w˜
dτF , (147a)
dx˜
∣∣F,H = ∂x˜
∂τH
dτH
∣∣F,H + ∂x˜
∂τF
dτF
=
∂x˜
∂τF
[
1− θ (w˜ − κ)
(
1 + τF
)
w˜ (1− τH)
]
dτF =
dx˜
dτF
κ
w˜
dτF , (147b)
(147c)
where x = c,K,L, b and we used the fact that ∂x˜
∂τH
=
(w˜−κ)(1+τF )
w˜(1−τH)
∂x˜
∂τF
. From (147b), the
long-run changes of real consumption, physical capital and employment fiscal tax reform fol-
lowing a substitution of payroll taxes for income wage taxes are proportional to the steady-state
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variations after a change in τF . Consequently, according to (90), the fiscal tax reform unam-
biguously raises real consumption and labor supply, and stimulates capital accumulation in the
long-run.
By substituting of long-run changes of real consumption and employment, we obtain:
dZ =
{
−σcpcc˜σLL˜Λ˜
∆
(
τ c + τA
)
+ κ
(
1− τH
1 + τF
)
L˜
}
dτF ,
=
σLw˜
(
1− τH) L˜
∆
w˜L˜
{
−σcpcc˜
w˜AL˜
(
τ c + τA
)
+
κ
w˜
(
σcpcc˜
σLw˜F L˜
+ 1
)}
dτF , (148)
The change in government revenues following the fiscal reform strategy is unclear. While the
substitution of labor income taxes for payroll taxes improve the earnings of the state by raising
real consumption (hence the fiscal basis of consumption taxes) together with labor (hence the
fiscal basis of labor taxes), the fall in government revenues due to the insufficient rise in the
labor income tax rate plays in opposite direction. The latter effect must predominate over
the former effect so that government revenues fall. The explanation is as follows. Since the
labor income tax rate must rise by an amount w˜w˜−κ
1−τH
1+τF
to maintain the government budget
constraint balanced, the increase in τH is not large enough for this condition to be fulfilled,
since the labor income tax rate rises by 1−τ
H
1+τF
which is smaller.
K Tax Multipliers
In this section, we derive analytical expressions of overall and sectoral tax multipliers.
K.1 Overall Tax Multipliers
Long-Run Tax Multiplier
Because overall output denoted by Y is the sum of traded output Y T and non traded
output measured in terms of the traded good pµY
N , using the fact that Y T ≡ Y T (K,L, p) and
Y N ≡ Y N (K,L, p), remembering that steady-state level of the real exchange rate is unaffected
by a tax restructuring, the steady-state change of overall output can be expressed as:
dY˜
∣∣j,k = (Y TK + p˜µY NK
)
dK˜
∣∣j,k + (Y TL + p˜µY NL
)
dL˜
∣∣j,k,
= p˜r?dK˜
∣∣j,k + wFdL˜∣∣j,k > 0. (149)
where we use properties (40b) and (40c) to get (149).
Initial Tax Multiplier
Adopting a similar procedure keeping in mind that the capital stock is initially predeter-
mined, the short-run tax multiplier writes as follows:
dY (0)
∣∣j,k = (Y TL + pµY NL
)
dL(0)
∣∣j,k + (Yˆ Tp + pµYˆ Np
)
dp(0)
∣∣j,k,
= wFdL(0)
∣∣j,k > 0, (150)
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where we use properties (40c) to get (150); according to property (40a), denoting by a hat the
partial derivative of Y w. r. t. p for given labor, Yˆ Tp +
p
µ Yˆ
N
p = 0;
K.2 Sectoral Tax Multipliers
Long-Run Sectoral Tax Multipliers
kN > kT
We calculate the tax multiplier in the traded sector by differentiating the short-run static
solution for Y T evaluated at the steady-state:
dY˜ T
∣∣j,k = Y TK dK˜∣∣j,k + Y TL dL˜∣∣j,k = Φj,k
[
Y TK
dK˜
dτ j
+ Y TL
dL˜
dτ j
]
dτF ,
=
ν1
ν2
σLL˜
∆
σcpcc˜Υj
{[
(1− αc) w˜F + r?p˜k˜N
]
+ αck˜Nr?
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)}
Φdτ j > 0, j = F,H, (151)
where dτ j < 0 since we consider a fall in the labor income tax rate τ j , Φj,c =
pcc˜
χc
[
1− w˜AL˜pc(1+τc)c˜
]
> 0 (with j = F,H) as longer as a˜ > 0, and ΦF,H = w˜κ > 0. To determine
(151), we used the fact that Y TL = −p˜ν1k˜N > 0, Y TK = p˜ν1 < 0,
(
ν2k˜
T + ν1k˜N
)
= − w˜Fp˜ < 0
and ν1 + ν2 = r?.
We calculate the tax multiplier in the non traded sector by differentiating the short-run
static solution for Y N/µ evaluated at the steady-state:
p˜
µ
dY˜ N
∣∣j,k = p˜
µ
Y NK dK˜
∣∣j,k + p˜
µ
Y NL dL˜
∣∣j,k = Φj,k [Y NK dK˜dτ j + Y NLµ dL˜dτ j
]
dτ j ,
= −σLL˜
∆
σcc˜
NΥj
{
w˜F − k˜T r?ω
1
2
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜kT ν2Λ˜
)}
Φdτ j > 0, (152)
where we used the fact that Y NK = µν2 > 0 and Y
N
L = −k˜Tµν2 < 0.
kT > kN
We calculate the tax multiplier in the traded sector by differentiating the short-run static
solution for Y T evaluated at the steady-state:
dY˜ T
∣∣j,k = Y TK dK˜∣∣j,c + Y TL dL˜∣∣j,c = Φj,k
[
Y TK
dK˜
dτ j
+ Y TL
dL˜
dτ j
]
dτF ,
=
ν2
ν1
σLL˜
∆
Υjσcpcc˜
[
(1− αc) w˜F + r?p˜k˜N
]
Φj,kdτ j > 0, j = F,H, (153)
where Υj > 0 and Φj,k > 0 (as longer as a˜ > 0. We used the fact that Y TL = −p˜ν2k˜N < 0,
Y TK = p˜ν2 > 0,
(
ν1k˜
T + ν2k˜N
)
= − w˜Fp˜ < 0 and ν1 + ν2 = r? to get (153).
We calculate the tax multiplier in the non traded sector by differentiating the short-run
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static solution for Y N/µ evaluated at the steady-state:
p˜
µ
dY˜ N
∣∣j,k = p˜
µ
Y NK dK˜
∣∣j,k + p˜
µ
Y NL dL˜
∣∣j,k = Φj,k [Y NK
µ
dK˜
dτ j
+
Y NL
µ
dL˜
dτ j
]
dτ j ,
= −σLL˜
∆
Υjσcc˜N w˜FΦj,kdτ j > 0, j = F,H, (154)
where we used the fact that Y NK = µν1 < 0 and Y
N
L = −k˜Tµν1 > 0 to get (154).
Short-Run Sectoral Tax Multipliers
kN > kT
Remembering that the short-run solution Y T ≡ Y T (K,L, p), using the fact that the capital
stock is initially predetermined, dL(0)
∣∣j,k = dL˜∣∣j,k + Lpdp(0)∣∣j,k and dp(0)∣∣j,k = −ω12dK˜∣∣j,k,
the short-run tax multiplier is given by:
dY T (0)
∣∣j,k = Y TL dL(0)∣∣j,k + Yˆ Tp dp(0)∣∣j,k,
= −Φj,k
[
p˜ν1k˜
N dL˜
dτ j
+ Y Tp ω
1
2
dK˜
dτ j
]
dτ j ≷ 0, (155)
where we used the fact that Y TL = −p˜ν1k˜N > 0; we denoted by a hat the partial derivative of
Y T w. r. t. p for given labor, i. e. Yˆ Tp < 0, and we used the fact that Y
T
L Lp + Yˆ
T
p = Y
T
p . The
short-run tax multiplier in the traded sector is the result of two conflictory forces: while the
initial stimulus of labor supply induces a labor inflow in the traded sector, the real exchange
appreciation shifts away resources from the traded sector towards the non traded sector.
Differentiating the short-run solution for Y N ≡ Y N (K,L, p) and remembering that the
capital stock is initially predetermined, the short-run tax multiplier is given by:
p
µ
dY N (0)
∣∣j,k = p
µ
Y NL dL(0)
∣∣j,k + p
µ
Yˆ Np dp(0)
∣∣j,k,
= −Φj,k
[
p˜ν1k˜
N dL˜
dτ j
+
Y Np
µ
ω12
dK˜
dτ j
]
dτ j ≷ 0, (156)
where we used the fact that Y NL = −k˜Tµν2 < 0, and we denoted by a hat the partial derivative
of Y N w. r. t. p for given labor, i. e. Yˆ Np > 0. The short-run tax multiplier in the non traded
sector is the result of two conflictory forces: while the initial stimulus of labor supply induces
a labor outflow from the non traded sector, the real exchange appreciation attracts resources
in the non traded sector.
kT > kN
Remembering that the short-run solution Y T ≡ Y T (K,L, p), using the fact that the capital
stock is initially predetermined and the real exchange is unaffected by a tax restructuring, the
short-run tax multiplier is given by:
dY T (0)
∣∣j,k = Y TL dL(0)∣∣j,k = Y TL dL˜∣∣j,k < 0, (157)
where we used the fact that Y TL = −p˜ν2k˜N < 0,
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Differentiating the short-run solution for Y N ≡ Y N (K,L, p) and remembering that the
capital stock is initially predetermined, the short-run tax multiplier is given by:
p
µ
dY N (0)
∣∣j,k = p
µ
Y NL dL(0)
∣∣j,k = p
µ
Y NL dL˜
∣∣j,k > 0, (158)
where we used the fact that Y NL = −k˜Tµν1 > 0.
L Welfare Analysis
In this section, we investigate the welfare effects of an unanticipated of tax restructuring which
involves simultaneously cutting labor tax by dτ j < 0 (j = F,H) and raising the consumption
tax rate or the labor income tax rate by dτk > 0 (k = c,H). We denote by φ the instantaneous
welfare:
φ(t) = u (c(t)) + v (L(t)) , (159)
and by U its discounted value over an infinite horizon:
U =
∫ ∞
0
φ(t) exp (−δt) dt. (160)
L.1 Instantaneous Welfare
We first linearize the instantaneous utility function (159) in the neighborhood of the steady-
state:
φ(t) = φ˜+ uc (c˜) (c(t)− c˜) + vL(L˜)
(
L(t)− L˜
)
, (161)
with φ˜ given by
φ˜ = u (c˜) + v
(
L˜
)
. (162)
By substituting solutions for c(t) and L(t), we obtain the stable solution for instantaneous
welfare:
φ(t) = φ˜+ [uccp + vLLp]ω12
(
K0 − K˜
)
eν1t, (163)
where partial derivatives are evaluated at the steady-state, i. e. uc = uc (c˜) and vL = vL
(
L˜
)
.
We estimate the expression in square brackets by making use of the first-order conditions
for consumption and labor supply supply decisions evaluated at the steady-state, i. e. uc =
pcλ¯ (1 + τ c) and vL = −λ¯w˜A. We obtain:
uccp + vLLp = λ¯
−σcc˜N (1 + τ c) + w˜A
w˜F
σLL˜k˜
T Λ˜
h˜
µ
(
k˜N − k˜T
)
 ≷ 0. (164)
Evaluate (159) at the steady-state and differentiate, one obtains the long-run change of φ
after a tax restructuring:
dφ˜
∣∣j,k = Φj,k [uc dc˜dτ j dτ j + vL dL˜dτ j
]
dτ j ≷ 0, (165)
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where 0 < Φj,k < 1.
Evaluate (163) at time t = 0 and differentiate, we get the initial reaction of φ after a tax
restructuring:
dφ(0)
∣∣j,k = dφ˜∣∣j,k − (uccp + vLLp)ω12dK˜∣∣j,k,
= Φj,k
{
uc
[
dc˜
dτ j
− cpω12
dK˜
dτ j
]
+ vL
[
dL˜
dτ j
− Lpω12
dK˜
dτ j
]}
dτ j , (166)
where we used (165) to get (166).
Case kN > kT
If the non traded sector is more capital intensive than the traded sector, the long-run change
of φ after a tax restructuring writes as follows:
dφ˜
∣∣j,k = Φj,k{pcλ¯ (1 + τ c) [1− w˜A
w˜F
1
pc (1 + τ c)
]
dc˜
dτ j
dτ j
+ Γj λ¯
σLL˜
∆
w˜A
σcpcc˜
p˜
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2Λ˜
)(
αc +
k˜T p˜ν2
w˜F
)}
dτ j ≷ 0, (167)
where 0 < Φj,k < 1 and Γj > 0. We substituted uc = pcλ¯ (1 + τ c) and vL = −λ¯w˜A, and we
used the fact that dL˜dτj =
pc
w˜F
dc˜
dτj − Γj
σLL˜
∆
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
(
σcc˜
N − σLL˜k˜T ν2Λ˜
)
σcc˜
N to determine (167).
Since the sign of the long-run change of instantaneous welfare is not clear-cut, we dot not
calculate the initial reaction of φ which in particular depends on expression (167).
Case kT > kN
If the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector, the long-run change
of φ after a tax restructuring writes as follows:
dφ˜
∣∣j,k = Φj,kpcλ¯ (1 + τ c) [1− w˜A
w˜F
1
1 + τ c
]
dc˜
dτ j
dτ j > 0, (168)
where 0 < Φj,k < 1. We substituted uc = pcλ¯ (1 + τ c) and vL = −λ¯w˜A, and we used the fact
that dL˜dτ j =
pc
w˜F
dc˜
dτ j to determine (168).
L.2 Overall Welfare
Until now, we have analyzed the instantaneous welfare implications of an unanticipated perma-
nent fiscal expansion, say at different points of times. To address welfare effects in a convenient
way within an intertemporal-maximizing framework, we have to evaluate the discounted value
of (159) over the agent’s infinite planning horizon. Whereas the change of overall welfare
will be estimated numerically, we determine its measure along a transitional path after a tax
restructuring.
In order to have a correct and comprehensive measure of welfare, we calculate first the
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discounted value of instantaneous welfare over the entire planning horizon:
U =
φ˜
δ
+
[uccp + vLLp]ω12
r? − ν1 A1
=
φ˜
δ
+
φ(0)− φ˜
r? − ν1 . (169)
The first term on the right hand-side of (169) represents the capitalized value of instantaneous
welfare evaluated at the steady-state. The second term on the RHS of (169) vanishes whenever
the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector since the dynamics of
the real exchange degenerate. If consumption reacts strongly on impact and labor is not too
much responsive, then φ(0) can overshoot its long-run level which exerts a positive influence
on overall welfare.
Case kN > kT
If the non traded sector is more capital intensive than the traded sector, the long-run change
of φ after a tax restructuring writes as follows:
dU
∣∣j,k = 1
δ
dφ˜
∣∣j,k − [uccp + vLLp]ω12
r? − ν1 dK˜
∣∣j,k
=
1
r?ν2
Φj,k
{
uc
[
dc˜
dτ j
− r?cpω12
dK˜
dτ j
]
+ vL
[
dL˜
dτ j
− r?Lpω12
dK˜
dτ j
]}
dτ j ≷ 0, (170)
with
dc˜
dτ j
− r?cpω12
dK˜
dτ j
=
σLL˜
∆
σcc˜Υj
{
p˜ν1k˜
N
[
1 + αcσc
c˜N
p˜
r?
ν2
ω12
]
+ r?k˜T ν2ω12
[
σcc˜
Nαc − σLL˜k˜T Λ˜
]}
< 0, (171a)
dL˜
dτ j
− r?Lpω12
dK˜
dτ j
= −σLL˜
∆
σcc˜Υj
{
ν2
[
1 + αcσc
c˜N
p˜
r?
ν2
ω12
ν2
]
+
r?
ν2
ω12
p˜
σLL˜k˜
T Λ˜
[
αc (1− σc) + p˜ν2k˜
T
w˜F
]}
≶ 0. (171b)
Case kT > kN
If the traded sector is more capital intensive than the non traded sector, the long-run change
of φ after a tax restructuring writes as follows:
dU
∣∣j,k = 1
δ
dφ˜
∣∣j,k > 0, (172)
where dφ˜
∣∣j,k > 0 is given by (168).
M The Case of Endogenous Markup
There are two sectors in the economy: a perfectly competitive sector which produces a traded
good denoted by the superscript T and an imperfectly competitive sector which produces a
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non traded good denoted by the superscript N . We assume that each producer of a unique
variety of the non traded good has the following technology XNj = H (Kj ,Lj) with Kj the
capital stock and Lj labor.
M.1 Framework
The final non traded output, Y N , is produced in a competitive retail sector using a constant-
returns-to-scale production function which aggregates a continuum measure one of sectoral non
traded goods:
Y N =
[∫ 1
0
(QNj )ω−1ω dj] ωω−1 , (173)
where ω > 0 represents the elasticity of substitution between any two different sectoral goods
andQNj stands for intermediate consumption of sector’j variety (with j ∈ [0, N ]). The final good
producers behave competitively, and the households use the final good for both consumption
and investment.
In each of the j sectors, there are N > 1 firms producing differentiated goods that are
aggregated into a sectoral non traded good by a CES aggregating function. The non traded
output sectoral good j writes as:34
QNj = N−
1
²−1
[∫ N
0
(XNi,j) ²−1² di] ²²−1 , (174)
where XNi,j stands for output of firm i in sector j and ² is the elasticity of substitution between
any two varieties.
Denoting by p and Pj the relative price of the final good and of the jth variety of the
intermediate good, respectively, the profit the final good producer is written as follows:
ΠN = p
[∫ N
0
(QNj )ω−1ω dj] ωω−1 − ∫ 1
0
PjQNj dj. (175)
Total cost minimizing for a given level of final output gives the (intratemporal) demand function
for each input:
QNj =
(Pj
p
)−ω
Y N , (176)
and the price of the final output is given by:
p =
(∫ 1
0
P1−ωj dj
) 1
1−ω
. (177)
where Pj is the price index of sector j and p is the price of the final good.
Within each sector, there is monopolistic competition; each firm that produces one variety
XNi,j is a price setter. Intermediate output XNi,j is produced using capital KNi,j and labor LNi,j :
XNi,j = H
(KNi,j ,LNi,j) . (178)
34By having the term N−
1
²−1 in (174), the analysis abstracts from the variety effect and concentrates solely
on the effects of markup variation.
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Denoting by Pi,j the price of good i in sector j, the profit function for the jth sector good
producer denoted by piNj is:
piNj ≡ PjN−
1
²−1
(∫ N
0
(XNi,j) ²−1² di) ²²−1 − ∫ N
0
Pi,jXNi,jdi. (179)
The demand faced by each producer XNi,j is defined as :
XNi,j =
(Pi,j
Pj
)−² QNj
N
, (180)
and the price index of sector j is given by:
Pj = N−
1
1−²
(∫ N
0
P1−²i,j di
) 1
1−²
. (181)
Combining (176) and (180), the demand for variety XNi,j can be expressed in terms of the
relative price of the final non traded good:
XNi,j =
(Pi,j
Pj
)−²(Pj
p
)−ω Y N
N
. (182)
In order to operate, each intermediate good producer must pay a fixed cost denoted by FC
measured in terms of the final good which is assumed to be symmetric across firms. Each firm
j chooses capital and labor to maximize profits. The profit function for the ith producer in
sector j denoted by piNi,j is:
piNi,j ≡ PjH
(KNj ,LNj )− rKKNj − wFLNj − pFC. (183)
The demands for capital and hours worked are given by the equalities of the markup-adjusted
marginal revenues of capital PjHKµ and labor
PjHL
µ , to the capital rental rate r
K and the
producer wage wF , respectively.
M.2 First-Order Conditions
The current-value Hamiltonian for the j-th firm’s optimization problem in the non traded sector
writes as follows:
HNj = PjH
(KNj ,LNj )− rKKNj − wFLNj − pFC + ηj [H (KNj ,LNj )−XNi,j] , (184)
where XNj stands for the demand for variety j; firm j chooses its price %j to maximize profits
treating the factor prices as given. First-order conditions for the non traded sector write as
follows:
PjHK + ηHK = rK , , (185a)
PjHL + ηHL = wF , (185b)
ηj = P ′jHj , (185c)
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Combining (185a)-(185b) with (185c), by assuming that firms j are symmetric, yields:
PjHK
(
1− 1
ej
)
= rK , (186a)
PjHL
(
1− 1
ej
)
= wF , (186b)
where we used the fact that
P′j
PjXNi,j
= − 1ej .
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where all firms in the intermediate good sector pro-
duce the output level XNi,j = XN with the same quantities of labor LNi,j = LN and capital
KNi,j = KN . Hence, the aggregate stock of physical capital and hours worked are KN = NKN
and LN = NLN , respectively. They also set the same price Pi,j = P. Hence, eqs. (177) and
(181) imply that P = p.
Defining the markup µ = ee−1 , first-order conditions rewrite as follows:
p
HK
µ
= rK , (187a)
p
HL
µ
= wF . (187b)
We follow Yang and Heijdra [1993] and Jaimovich and Floetotto [2008] by taking into
account the influence of the individual price on the sectoral price index:
e (N) = ²− (²− ω)
N
, N ∈ (1,∞) . (188)
As it will be useful later, we calculate expressions of the partial derivatives of the price-
elasticity of demand and the markup with respect to the number of firms:
eN =
∂e
∂N
=
²− ω
N2
> 0, µN =
∂µ
∂N
= − eN
(e− 1)2 = −
eN
e− 1
µ
e
< 0, (189)
where we let µ = ee−1 .
We further assume that free entry drives profits down to zero in every non traded sector
at each instant of time. Using constant returns to scale in production, i. e. X = H (K,L) =
HKK +HLL, and the zero profit condition, in the aggregate, we have
pH
(
KN , LN
)− rKKN − wFLN − pNFC = 0. (190)
Substituting the short-run static solution for non traded output (37), the zero-profit condition
(190) can be rewritten as:
Y N
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH , µ(N)
)(
1− 1
µ(N)
)
= NFC. (191)
M.3 Short-Run Static Solution for the Number of Firms
The zero profit condition can be solved for the number of producers in the non traded sector:
N = N
(
K, p, λ¯, τF , τH
)
, (192)
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with partial derivatives given by:
Nx ≡ ∂N
∂x
= −Y
N
x ωFC
χ
≷ 0, (193)
where x = K, p, λ¯, τF , τH , ωFC ≡ NFC/Y N stands for the share of fixed costs in markup
adjusted output and we set
χ =
Y N
N
{[
ηY N ,µ (µ− 1) + 1
] ηµ,N
µ
− ωFC
}
, (194)
Inspection of (194) shows that χ < 0 if ηµ,N is not too large. This implies that an input inflow
ion the non traded sector that raises Y N and thereby yields to profit opportunities stimulates
entry of firms.
M.4 Equilibrium Dynamics and Formal Solutions
Inserting short-run static solutions for non traded output and consumption, given by (37) and
(29) respectively, into the non traded good market-clearing condition (9), and inserting short-
run static solution for capital-labor ratio in the non traded good sector (31) into the dynamic
equation for the real exchange rate (5d), and substituting the short-run static solution for the
number of firms (192) yields:
K˙ =
Y N {K, pµ [N (K, p)]}
µ [N (K, p)]
− cN (p)− δKK − gN , (195a)
p˙ = p
{
r? + δK −
hk
(
kN {p, µ [N (K, p)]})
µ [N (K, p)]
}
. (195b)
For clarity purpose, we dropped variables which are constant over time from short-run static
solutions.
Linearizing these two equations around the steady-state, and denoting x˜ = K˜, p˜ the long-
term values of x = K, p, we obtain in a matrix form:(
K˙, p˙
)T
= J
(
K(t)− K˜, p(t)− p˜
)T
, (196)
where J is given by
J ≡
 b11 b12
b21 b22
 , (197)
with
b11 =
Y N
µ
[
Y NK
Y N
− µN
µ
NK
(
1− Y
N
µ µ
Y N
)]
− δK , (198a)
b12 =
Y N
µ
[
Y Np
Y N
− µN
µ
Np
(
1− Y
N
µ µ
Y N
)]
− cNp , (198b)
b21 =
p
µ
hkk
µNNK
µ
kN
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)
, (198c)
b22 = − p
µ
hkk
[
kNp −
µNNp
µ
kN
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)]
, (198d)
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Equilibrium Dynamics
The determinant denoted by Det of the linearized 2 × 2 matrix (44) is unambiguously
negative:
Det J = b11b22 − b12b21
=
(
Y NK
µ
− δK
)[
Y TK
p˜
+
p
µ
hkkk
N µNNp
µ
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)]
−µN
µ
NK
[
Y N
µ
(
1− Y
N
µ µ
Y N
)
Y TK
p˜
+
(
Y Np
µ
− cNp
)
p
µ
hkkk
N
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)]
,(199)
and the trace denoted by Tr given by
Tr J = b11 + b22 =
Y TK
µ
+
Y NK
p
− δK
−µN
µ
[
NK
Y N
µ
(
1− Y
N
µ µ
Y N
)
−Np p
µ
hkkk
N
(
hk
hkkkN
− k
N
µ µ
kN
)]
,
= r? − µN
µ
NK
Y N
µ
> 0, (200)
where we used the fact that Y
T
K
µ +
Y NK
p =
hk
µ = r
? + δK ; the positive sign follows from NK > 0
and µN < 0.
Characteristic roots from J write as follows:
νi ≡ 12
{
Tr J±
√
(Tr J)2 − 4Det J
}
≷ 0, i = 1, 2. (201)
We denote by ν1 < 0 and ν2 > 0 the stable and unstable real eigenvalues, satisfying
ν1 < 0 < r? < ν2. (202)
Since the system features one state variable, K, and one jump variable, p, the equilibrium
yields a unique one-dimensional stable saddle-path.
General solutions are those described by (53) with eigenvector ωi2 associated with eigenvalue
µi given by
ωi2 =
νi − b11
b12
, (203)
Formal Solution for the Stock of Foreign Assets
We first linearize equation (11) around the steady-state:
b˙(t) = r?
(
b(t)− b˜
)
+
[
Y TK + Y
T
µ µNNK
] (
K(t)− K˜
)
+
[(
Y Tp + Y
T
µ µNNp
)− cTp ] (p(t)− p˜) .
(204)
where cTp is given by (30b).
Using the fact that p(t)− p˜ = ω12
(
K(t)− K˜
)
, setting
N1 =
[
Y TK + Y
T
µ µNNK
]
+
[(
Y Tp + Y
T
µ µNNp
)− cTp ]ω12, (205)
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solving for the differential equation and invoking the transversality condition for intertemporal
solvency, i. e. equation (12), the stable solution for net foreign assets finally reduces to:
b(t)− b˜ = Φ1
(
K(t)− K˜
)
, (206)
and the linearized version of the nation’s intertemporal budget constraint:
b˜− b0 = Φ1
(
K˜ −K0
)
(207)
where we substituted B1 ≡ K0 − K˜.
M.5 Stable Solutions for L, N , and w
Linearizing the short-run static solutionN = N ((K, p) yields the stable solution for the number
of firms:
N(t) = N˜ +NK
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+Np (p(t)− p˜) ,
= N˜ +
(
NK +Npω12
)
(K(t)− K˜. (208)
Evaluating at time t = 0 and differentiating yields the initial response of the number of firms :
dN(0)|j,k = dN˜ |j,k − {NK +Npω12) dK˜|j,k. (209)
Linearizing the short-run static solution for labor L = L (p, µ), using the fact that µ =
µ (N), and substituting the appropriate solutions, the solution for L(t) reads:
L(t) = L˜+ Lp (p(t)− p˜) + Lµ (µ(t)− µ˜) , (210)
= L˜+ Lp
[
ω12 −
p˜
µ˜
µN
(
NK +Npω12
)]
(K(t)− K˜), (211)
where we used the fact that Lµ = −Lppµ . Evaluating at time t = 0 and differentiating yields
the initial response of employment :
dL(0)|j,k = dL˜j,k − Lp
[
ω12 −
p˜
µ˜
µN
(
NK +Npω12
)]
dK˜j,k. (212)
Linearizing the short-run static solution for the wage rate w = w (p, µ) and substituting
appropriate solutions yields:
w(t) = w˜ + wpω12
(
K(t)− K˜
)
+ wµµN
(
N(t)− N˜
)
,
= w˜ + wp
[
ω12 −
p˜
µ˜
µN
(
NK +Npω11
)]
(K(t)− K˜), (213)
where we used the fact that wµ = −wppµ . Evaluating at time t = 0 and differentiating yields
the initial response of the wage rate:
dw(0)|j,k = dw˜j,k − wp
[
ω12 −
p˜
µ˜
µN
(
NK +Npω12
)]
dK˜j,k. (214)
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M.6 Overall Tax Multipliers
Long-Run Tax Multiplier
Because overall output denoted by Y is the sum of traded output Y T and non traded
output measured in terms of the traded good pµY
N , using the fact that Y T ≡ Y T (K,L, p, µ)
and Y N ≡ Y N (K,L, p, µ), remembering that a tax restructuring exerts a long-term effect on
the relative price of non tradables, the steady-state change of overall output can be expressed
as:
dY˜
∣∣j,k = (Y TK + p˜µY NK
)
dK˜
∣∣j,k + (Y TL + p˜µY NL
)
dL˜
∣∣j,k,
= p˜r?dK˜
∣∣j,k + wFdL˜∣∣j,k > 0. (215)
where we use properties (40b) and (40c) to get (149); according to property (40a), denoting
by a hat the partial derivative of Y w. r. t. p for given labor, Yˆ Tp +
p
µ Yˆ
N
p = Yˆ
T
µ +
p
µ Yˆ
N
µ = 0.
Using the fact that Y T (t) = cT (t) + gT − r?b(t) + ca(t) = cT + gT + nx(t) and Y N (t)µ =
cN (t)+gN+I(t), the overall output is equal to Y (t) = pc (p(t)) c(t)+gT+p(t)+gN+nx(t)+I(t).
The steady-state change of GDP following a tax reform is equal to:
dY˜
∣∣j,k = Y˜ N
µ˜
dp˜
∣∣j,k + pcdc˜∣∣j,k + dn˜x∣∣j,k + p˜dI˜∣∣j,k, (216)
where dn˜x
∣∣j,k = −r?db˜∣∣j,k and dI˜∣∣j,k = δKdK˜∣∣j,k.
Initial Tax Multiplier
Keeping in mind that the capital stock is initially predetermined, the short-run tax multi-
plier writes as follows:
dY (0)
∣∣j,k = (Y TL + pµY NL
)
dL(0)
∣∣j,k + (Yˆ Tp + pµYˆ Np
)
dp(0)
∣∣j,k + (Yˆ Tµ + pµYˆ Nµ
)
µNdN(0)
∣∣j,k,
= wFdL(0)
∣∣j,k > 0, (217)
where we use properties (40c) to get (150); according to property (40a), denoting by a hat the
partial derivative of Y w. r. t. p for given labor, Yˆ Tp +
p
µ Yˆ
N
p = Yˆ
T
µ +
p
µ Yˆ
N
µ = 0.
Linearizing around the steady-state yields:
Y (t) = Y˜ +
Y˜ N
µ˜
(p(t)− p˜) + (nx(t)− n˜x) + p˜
(
I(t)− I˜
)
.
Using (216), the initial reaction of GDP is given by:
dY (0)
∣∣j,k = Y˜ N
µ˜
dp(0)
∣∣j,k + pcdc(0)∣∣j,k + dnx(0)∣∣j,k + dI(0)∣∣j,k, (218)
where dc(0)
∣∣j,k = dc˜∣∣j,k − cpω12dK˜∣∣j,k, dp(0)∣∣j,k = dp˜∣∣j,k − ω12dK˜∣∣j,k, dI(0) = −µ1dK˜∣∣j,k and
dnx(0)
∣∣j,k = dca(0)∣∣j,k = −µ1Φ1dK˜∣∣j,k.
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M.7 Sectoral Tax Multipliers
Long-Run Sectoral Tax Multipliers
We calculate the tax multiplier in the traded sector by differentiating the short-run static
solution for Y T evaluated at the steady-state:
dY˜ T
∣∣j,k = Y TK dK˜∣∣j,k + Y TL dL˜∣∣j,k + Yˆ Tp dp˜∣∣j,k + Yˆ Tµ µNdN˜ ∣∣j,k. (219)
where Yˆ Tp < 0, Yˆ
T
µ > 0 and µN < 0.
Using the fact that Y T (t) = cT+gT+nx(t) and totally differentiating yields the steady-state
change of traded output following a tax reform:
dY˜ T
∣∣j,k = dc˜T ∣∣j,k + dn˜x∣∣j,k (220)
where dn˜x
∣∣j,k = −r?db˜∣∣j,k.
We calculate the tax multiplier in the non traded sector by differentiating the short-run
static solution for Y N/µ evaluated at the steady-state:
p˜
µ
dY˜ N
∣∣j,k = p˜
µ
Y NK dK˜
∣∣j,k + p˜
µ
Y NL dL˜
∣∣j,k + p˜
µ
Yˆ Tp dp˜
∣∣j,k + p˜
µ
Yˆ Tµ µNdN˜
∣∣j,k. (221)
where Yˆ Np > 0, Yˆ
T
µ < 0 and µN < 0.
Using the fact that Y
N (t)
µ = c
N (t)+ gN + I(t), and totally differentiating yields the steady-
state change of non traded output following a tax reform:
1
µ˜
dY˜ N
∣∣j,k = dc˜N ∣∣j,k + dI˜∣∣j,k, (222)
where dI˜
∣∣j,k = δKdK˜∣∣j,k.
Short-Run Sectoral Tax Multipliers
kN > kT
Remembering that the short-run solution Y T ≡ Y T (K,L, p, µ), using the fact that the
capital stock is initially predetermined, the short-run tax multiplier is given by:
dY T (0)
∣∣j,k = Y TL dL(0)∣∣j,k + Yˆ Tp dp(0)∣∣j,k + Yˆ Tµ µNdN(0)∣∣j,k, (223)
where dL(0)
∣∣j,k and dN(0)∣∣j,k are given by (212) and (209), respectively, and dp(0)∣∣j,k =
dp˜
∣∣j,k − ω12dK˜∣∣j,k.
Linearizing Y T (t) = cT + gT + nx(t) around the steady-state, evaluating at time t = 0 and
totally differentiating yields the initial of traded output following a tax reform:
dY T (0)
∣∣j,k = dcT (0)∣∣j,k + dnx(0)∣∣j,k (224)
where dnx(0)
∣∣j,k = dca(0)∣∣j,k = −µ1Φ1dK˜∣∣j,k and dcT (0)∣∣j,k = −cTp ω12dK˜∣∣j,k.
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Differentiating the short-run solution for Y N ≡ Y N (K,L, p, µ) and remembering that the
capital stock is initially predetermined, the short-run tax multiplier is given by:
p
µ
dY N (0)
∣∣j,k = p
µ
Y NL dL(0)
∣∣j,k + p
µ
Yˆ Np dp(0)
∣∣j,k + p
µ
Yˆ Nµ µNdN(0)
∣∣j,k. (225)
where dL(0)
∣∣j,k and dN(0)∣∣j,k are given by (212) and (209), respectively, and dp(0)∣∣j,k =
dp˜
∣∣j,k − ω12dK˜∣∣j,k.
Linearizing Y
N (t)
µ = c
N (t) + gN + I(t), around the steady-state, evaluating at time t = 0
and totally differentiating yields the initial of non traded output following a tax reform:
1
µ˜
dY˜ N
∣∣j,k = dcN (0)∣∣j,k + dI(0)∣∣j,k, (226)
where dcTN (0)
∣∣j,k = −cNp ω12dK˜∣∣j,k and dI(0) = −µ1dK˜∣∣j,k.
M.8 Substitution of Payroll Taxes for Consumption Taxes: The Case of
Endogenous Markup
In this section, we re-estimate the long-run effects of a fall in the payroll tax τF associated with
a rise in the consumption tax rate τ c, which is adjusted accordingly to balance the government
budget, by allowing the markup to be endogenous.
We first substitute short-run static solutions for consumption, wage rate, and labor, into
the balanced government budget constraint (8) evaluated at the steady-state:
τ cpc (p˜) c
(
λ¯, p˜, τ c
)
+
[(
τF + τH
)
w
(
p˜, τF , µ˜
)− τHκ]L (λ¯, p˜, τF , τH , µ˜) = Z, (227)
keeping in mind that the long-run value of the relative is now affected by a change in the tax
rate trough the change in the markup.
Holding τH constant, we differentiate (227):
pcc˜dτ c
∣∣F,c + τ cpcdc˜∣∣F,c + [τ cc˜N + (τF + τH)wpL˜]dp˜∣∣F,c + (τF + τH)wpL˜µNdN˜ ∣∣F,c
+
[(
τF + τH
)
wτF + w˜
]
L˜dτF +
(
w˜F − w˜A)dL˜∣∣F,c = 0, (228)
with
[(
τF + τH
)
wτF + w˜
]
= w˜
(
1−τH
1+τF
)
> 0.
By using the fact that dx˜
∣∣F,c = dx˜dτF dτF + dx˜dτcdτ c∣∣F,c, and by rearranging terms, we can
determine the size of the rise in the consumption tax rate τ c
∣∣F,c after a fall in the payroll tax
τF such that the governement budget constraint (227) remains balanced:
dτ c
∣∣F,c = −χF
χc
dτF , (229)
79
where χF and χc are given by:
χF = τ cpc
dc˜
dτF
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτF
+
(
1− τH
1 + τF
)
w˜L˜
+
[
τ cc˜N +
(
τF + τH
)
wpL˜
] dp˜
dτF
+
(
τF + τH
)
wpL˜µN
dN˜
dτF
> 0, (230a)
χc = τ cpc
dc˜
dτ c
+
(
w˜F − w˜A) dL˜
dτ c
+ pcc˜
+
[
τ cc˜N +
(
τF + τH
)
wpL˜
] dp˜
dτ c
+
(
τF + τH
)
wpL˜µN
dN˜
dτ c
> 0. (230b)
The size of the rise in τ c will be estimated numerically.
N Data and Estimation Methodology
The calibration of output shares of capital income (θT , θN ) and markup (µN ) are based on the
EU KLEMS sectoral database, comprising 11 industries and 13 countries over the period 1970-
2004.35 Following De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf [1994], Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry
and Fishing; Mining and Quarrying; Total Manufacturing; Transport and Storage; and Com-
munication are classified as traded goods with weights given by relative nominal value added
within the sector. Electricity, Gas and Water Supply; Construction; Wholesale and Retail
Trade; Hotels and Restaurants; Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services; and
Community Social and Personal Services industries account for the non traded sector. The
dataset enables construction of aggregate data on traded and non traded output, capital stock
and employment. Sectoral ratios Y N/Y and LN/L immediately follow.
Markups are estimated at the industry level for each country and are aggregated as follows
to construct µT and µN :
µT =
4∑
j=1
ωjT µˆj µ
N =
6∑
j=1
ωjN µˆj , (231)
where ωjT (resp. ωjN ) is the nominal value added-weight of industry j in sector T (resp.
N). The estimates µˆj are obtained applying the consistent methodology developed by Roeger
[1995]. This approach takes account of labor, capital and intermediate inputs as production
factors and the specific variables required to apply the Roeger’s method are the following: gross
output (at basic current prices), compensation of employees, intermediate inputs at current
purchasers prices, and capital services (volume) indices. The testable equation of the Roeger’s
methodology may be written as:
yj,t = βj xj,t + εj,t, (232)
with yj , t = ∆(pj,tYj,t) − αN,t∆(wj,tLj,t) − αM,t∆(mj,tMj,t) − (1− αN,t − αM,t)∆ (rtKj,t),
xj,t = ∆(pj,tYj,t) − ∆(rtKj,t), and εj,t the i.i.d. error term. ∆ (pj,tYj,t) denotes the nomi-
35Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, the
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US).
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nal output growth in industry j, ∆ (wj,tLj,t) the nominal labor cost growth, ∆ (mj,tMj,t) the
growth in nominal intermediate input costs and ∆ (rtKj,t) the nominal capital cost growth. All
these variables are compiled from the EU KLEMS database except the user cost of capital rt.
No sector-specific information was available to construct rt, so the rental price of capital is cal-
culated as rt(≡ rj,t) = pI (i− piGDP + δK), with pI is the deflator for business non residential
investment, i the long-term nominal interest rate, piGDP the GDP deflator based inflation rate
and the depreciation rate is fixed at 5% throughout (pI , i and piGDP were taken from OECD
database). An econometric issue faced when estimating (232) with the OLS is the potential
endogeneity of the regressor associated with the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the
error term. To tackle these problems, we estimate (232) by using heteroskedastic and auto-
correlation consistent standard errors as suggested by Newey and West [1993] (lag truncation
=2). Finally, the markup estimate µˆj is equal to 1/(1− βˆj).36
Sectoral government expenditure data over the period 1978-2004 were obtained from
the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook and OECD database. Following Morshed and
Turnovsky [2004], the following four sectors were treated as traded: Fuel and Energy; Agri-
culture, Forestry, Fishing, and Hunting; Mining, Manufacturing, and Construction; Transport
and Communications. The following sectors were treated as being non traded: Government
Public Services; Defense; Public Order and Safety; Education; Health; Social Security and
Welfare; Housing and Community Amenities; Recreation Cultural and Community Affairs.
Disaggregation of gross fixed capital formation in OECD countries distinguishes between
five types of investment inputs. Products of Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Aquaculture;
Metal Products and machinery; and Transport Equipment are defined as traded inputs. Hous-
ing; and Other Buildings are treated as non traded investment goods (source: OECD Input-
Output database).
Payroll tax rate, labor income tax rate, and the consumption tax rate are specified as
effective tax rates and are computed according to the following formulas:
τF =
Taxes on payroll and workforce + Employers’ contribution to social security
Compensation of employees
,
τH = Income tax (average rate) + Employees’ social security contributions (average rate),
τ c =
Taxes on production, sale, transfer
Final consumption expenditure of households and general government
.
Tax allowances, κ, is calculated as the share of taxable income into the gross wage earnings
before taxes. All taxes and incomes data were taken from OECD database.
Finally, data for private consumption, government and investment expenditure, as well
36Countries estimates for each µˆj , j = 1, ..., 11, are not reported here to save space, but are available upon
request.
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those for GDP were drawn from the OECD ”National Accounts of OECD Countries” database.
Table (4) summarizes the values of the non tradable share in overall GDP, total employment,
public spending, and sectoral output shares of capital income, and, markups.
Table 4: Ratios for Countries
Y N
Y
LN
L
IN
I
gN
Y N
gT
Y T
c
Y
g
Y
I
Y
θT θN µ
Austria 0.65 0.60 0.59 0.28 0.07 0.55 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.32 1.52
Belgium 0.67 0.65 n.a. 0.30 0.09 0.54 0.24 0.22 0.33 0.35 1.39
Denmark 0.70 0.67 0.58 0.40 0.07 0.52 0.29 0.21 0.32 0.32 1.52
Spain 0.61 0.59 0.64 0.25 0.05 0.61 0.16 0.24 0.41 0.33 1.37
Finland 0.58 0.57 0.63 0.34 0.09 0.51 0.23 0.25 0.35 0.26 1.41
France 0.69 0.64 0.63 0.33 0.06 0.56 0.24 0.21 0.27 0.30 1.42
Germany 0.64 0.61 0.61 0.30 0.06 0.57 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.35 1.55
Italy 0.63 0.56 0.54 0.29 0.06 0.58 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.33 1.73
Japan 0.64 0.61 0.59 n.a. n.a. 0.53 0.14 0.30 0.42 0.39 1.63
Netherlands 0.67 0.69 0.63 0.34 0.08 0.50 0.25 0.22 0.37 0.29 1.36
Sweden 0.65 0.67 0.47 0.43 0.09 0.49 0.31 0.20 0.30 0.30 1.44
UK 0.62 0.66 0.52 0.33 0.05 0.60 0.23 0.19 0.30 0.28 1.47
US 0.68 0.72 0.59 0.22 0.06 0.66 0.17 0.19 0.36 0.32 1.42
Total average 0.65 0.63 0.59 0.32 0.07 0.56 0.22 0.23 0.32 0.32 1.48
kT > kN 0.64 0.64 0.60 0.30 0.07 0.57 0.20 0.23 0.37 0.31 1.44
kN > kT 0.66 0.63 0.57 0.33 0.07 0.55 0.24 0.22 0.28 0.33 1.51
References
De Gregorio, J., Giovannini A. and Wolf H.C. (1994) International Evidence on Tradables
and Nontradables Inflation. European Economic Review 38, pp. 1225-1244.
Glick, and Rogoff (1995) Global Versus Country-Specific Productivity Shocks and the Cur-
rent Account. Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 159-192.
Kakkar, Vikas (2003) The Relative Price of Nontraded Goods and Sectoral Total Factor
Productivity: an Empirical Investigation. Review of Economics and Statistics 85(2), pp.
444-452.
Morshed, Mahbub A. K. M., and Stefen J. Turnovsky (2004) Sectoral Adjustment Costs
and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics in a Two-Sector Dependent Economy. Journal of In-
ternational Economics 63, 147-177.
Newey, Whitney and Kenneth West (1987) A Simple Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedas-
ticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix, Econometrica, Vol. (51), pp. 703-
708.
82
Roeger, Werner (1995) Can Imperfect Competition Explain the Difference between Pri-
mal and Dual Productivity Measures? Estimates for U.S. Manufacturing. The Journal of
Political Economy 103(2), pp. 316-330.
83
